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REMEDIES FOR WAGE 
DISCRIMINATION 
Ruth Gerber Blumrosen* 
Eight years ago, issues of wage discrimination were only begin-
ning to reach the lower courts. At that time, I suggested a theory 
of wage discrimination based on the premise that the same fac-
tors that produced a segregated job were likely to produce a dis-
criminatorily depressed wage rate. 1 I noted that there were prac-
tical problems of fashioning remedies for discriminatorily 
depressed wage rates, but suggested that they could be resolved 
as easily as the courts had remedied other forms of employment 
discrimination. In light of eight years of court decisions, exten-
sive research studies, and a considerable amount of voluntary re-
vision of wage structures, the importance of examining remedies 
problems comprehensively is now clear. Courts have shied away 
from any theory of wage discrimination, largely out of fear of 
becoming enmeshed in the "dismal science" of wage economics, 
which seems to have no bounds. They are supported in these 
concerns both by employers, who emphasize the difficulty of de-
parting from the "market rate" in wage setting, and by some 
feminist supporters of one version of "comparable worth," which 
would turn the courts into a wage-setting bureaucracy. Faced 
with these risks, the courts, despite an arguably "green light" 
from the Supreme Court, 2 have refused, in the main, to take 
wage discrimination seriously. 
• Associate Professor, Graduate School of Management, Rutgers University; B.A., 
1947, J.D., 1953, University of Michigan; Consultant, United States Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 1965, 1979-1980 (with respect to the wage discrimina-
tion hearings); Consultant, United States Department of Health and Human Services, 
1980-1981; Advisor to the New Jersey Commission on Sex Discrimination in the Statutes 
(study and report, An Analysis of Wage Discrimination in New Jersey State Service 
(1983)) and to other employers, employees, unions, and state and local civil rights agen-
cies; Assistant to the Dean, Howard Law School, 1965-1967. Her article Wage Discrimi-
nation, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. 
REF. 397 (1979), developed the legal theory examined by the EEOC hearings in 1980. The 
views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of any government 
agency. 
1. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397 (1979) [hereinafter Wage Discrimination]. 
2. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). For a discussion of 
Gunther, see infra note 44. 
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The thesis of this Article is that wage discrimination can be 
remedied by the federal courts through a process that is both 
practical and efficient. This can be done, without turning the 
federal courts into wage control agencies or bankrupting the na-
tion's employers, by treating the problem of wage discrimination 
in precisely the same manner as other forms of discrimination 
are treated. Our experience with different types of wage discrim-
ination now permits us to generalize about the types of remedies 
that are appropriate to correct those typical forms of wage dis-
crimination that have now been fully identified. Part I describes 
the general pattern of proof of discrimination under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 19643 and applies that pattern to wage 
discrimination. It relates the practice of wage discrimination to 
the practice of job segregation, which is clearly illegal under Ti-
tle VII. It notes that the question of the quantum of a plaintiff's 
injuries in a class action is normally reserved for the second 
stage of litigation and is not a part of a plaintiff's prima facie 
case. Some courts, however, when dealing with wage discrimina-
tion, have erroneously and unnecessarily insisted on making the 
quantum of injury a part of that prima facie case. This has been 
done, I believe, at least in part, because of a concern that the 
remedy stage of a wage discrimination case will be too complex 
and uncertain to be manageable. Therefore, the courts have 
avoided facing the issues by imposing proof requirements that 
preclude plaintiffs from reaching the remedy stage of the case. 
Part II identifies three typical patterns of wage discrimination 
that have emerged from an analysis of studies and litigated cases 
during the past six years. It then describes practical remedies 
appropriate to each such pattern. The three stereotypical situa-
tions are: (1) where the employer has identified the differential 
that is based on race or sex; (2) where wages of significant num-
bers of minority or female employees are clustered below the 
wage of white male unskilled labor; and (3) where there is a vio-
lation of the Equal Pay Act' as to some jobs and a resulting pat-
tern of wage discrimination as to others. These three typical sit-
uations encompass most of the wage discrimination cases that 
are likely to arise under Title VII. Part III deals with the proof 
of discrimination in wage rates between men's and women's jobs, 
or between white male and minority jobs, by examination of the 
practices of a single employer. Part IV analyzes those legitimate 
factors that may cause pay differentials between individual 
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). 
4. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982). 
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workers, including the employer's need to be able to compete in 
a labor market where some skills may be in short supply. Part V 
demonstrates that these situations can be remedied by utilizing 
clear and easily applied principles that will be manageable by 
the courts and will not bankrupt employers. I estimate that most 
wage discrimination cases in these three typical situations can 
be remedied at a cost of one to four percent of the employer's 
payroll. 11 This Part also suggests some remedial steps employers 
or unions may wish to take voluntarily, even though a court 
might not order such actions. 
I. REMEDIES: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
Discrimination in compensation is proscribed by Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8 Under ordinary Title VII stan-
dards, plaintiffs can prove discrimination either by demonstrat-
ing adverse impact or disparate treatment. Title VII covers all 
privileges of employment7 and addresses "opportunities" and 
"benefits" as well as jobs themselves.8 Proof that women or mi-
norities were "steered" into segregated jobs at the low end of an 
employer's pay scale would meet either the disparate impact or 
disparate treatment standards, and would additionally show job 
segregation, which is independently proscribed by the statute. 
Thus, the concentration of women and minorities in low-paying 
jobs gives rise to either of two permissible inferences: (1) they 
were affirmatively directed to these low-paying jobs in the first 
instance, or (2) the decision as to what rates to pay these jobs 
was itself influenced by the sense that they were "worth less" 
because they were the jobs that women or minorities were ex-
pected to do. The low pay is thus a direct and foreseeable ad-
5. See infra note 154 and accompanying text. 
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). The Act provides in part: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(!) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment 
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
Civil Rights Act § 703(a), id. § 2000e-2(a). 
7. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984). 
8. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). 
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verse effect of the job segregation. It is therefore within the 
clear, explicit prohibitory language of the statute. 
Traditionally, society has paid those considered "inferior" less 
than those not so considered. This is the paradigm of discrimi-
nation. The most extreme example of this phenomenon is paying 
those considered inferior nothing! Both slavery and the unpaid 
work of women9 are classic examples. In this way, society has 
used "market forces" to reinforce its sense of which groups in 
society were "inferior." It was precisely to eliminate all vestiges 
of such discrimination that Title VII was passed. 
Under ordinary Title VII analysis, proof that the employer 
segregated women and minorities in low-paying positions would 
be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and 
compel an employer to demonstrate that its organization of 
workers and its decisions as to pay rates were based on "busi-
ness necessity" considerations, or at least "justified" on grounds 
that were "legitimate and nondiscriminatory."1° The plaintiff 
9. In Anglo-American law, marriage imposed certain duties on a wife, including con-
sortium (thus, a husband could not rape his wife), keeping house, providing meals, and 
caring for the children. These all were considered-and lawfully could be-unpaid. The 
husband owned or managed all the property. The wife's only "pay" was what her hus-
band chose to give her. During marriage, a husband could not be forced to support his 
wife. If he, however, chose to give nothing, she could charge "necessaries" to him-if a 
merchant would extend her the credit. The merchant could then recover the price of the 
goods from the husband. This system, combined with prohibitions on divorce, was analo-
gous to the laws forbidding manumission of aged or sick slaves. The object was not to 
pay for the work of slave or wife so much as to protect the public fisc. See, e.g., Green-
span v. Slate, 12 N.J. 426, 97 A.2d 390 (1953) (discussing English origins of law permit-
ting suit against the husband for necessaries). Recent attempts to require that house-
work be treated as if it were paid-including attempts to grant social security credits for 
housewifery, to include the estimated value of women's work in GNP, and to include 
housewives in labor force statistics-have not been successful. Compare the movement 
toward equitable distribution on the dissolution of marriage. 
10. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also Texas Dep't of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In a 
series of cases starting with Griggs, the Supreme Court developed the "disparate impact" 
or adverse effect theory of discrimination, which redefined discrimination in terms of 
consequence rather than motive, effect rather than purpose. In Griggs, the Court ruled 
that if an employer cannot show that an employment practice that operates to exclude 
blacks is related to job performance, the practice is prohibited by Title VII. Dothard v. 
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), made it clear that the Griggs analysis applied to sex in 
the same way it does to race. Although the employer may have defenses that are not 
applicable to race cases, that fact neither altered the nature of the prims facie case in 
Dothard nor relieved the employer from demonstrating business necessity. 
No showing of discriminatory purpose is required under a disparate impact analysis. 
Such a showing is "critical," however, for the disparate treatment theory, though such 
motive can sometimes be inferred from differences in treatment. The same set of facts 
may give rise to both a disparate treatment and a disparate impact claim. See, e.g., 
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. The order and nature of proof in disparate treatment 
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would then have the opportunity to demonstrate that these rea-
sons were not "legitimate" or "real reasons," but were instead a 
pretext for discrimination. 11 In any case involving race or na-
tional origin discrimination, the legal analysis of the Title VII 
action would be complete. 12 
After determining employer liability, courts turn to questions 
of remedy. They consider back pay in a second-stage proceed-
ing.13 "How much" is a question of remedy, not one of liability. 
If an employer has failed in its effort either to rebut the infer-
ence of discrimination or to justify the wage structure on 
grounds of business necessity, the plaintiff is entitled to prospec-
tive relief in the form of an injunction or some other appropriate 
order. 14 At this point, the question of how much the sex or race 
discrimination has affected the pay for the jobs identified as 
women's or minorities' is relevant to construct an appropriate 
order to rectify a system found to disadvantage women and mi-
norities and to assess damages. To the extent that precision in 
assessing damages is required, therefore, the precise amount the 
discrimination in the employer's wage-setting system has af-
cases have been worked out by the Court in a series of cases from McDonnell Douglas to 
Burdine. The burden on the plaintiff is not "onerous," Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; it is to 
supply sufficient information to raise an inference of discrimination. The burden of going 
forward then shifts to the respondent to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son for the decision. Finally, the plaintiff has an opportunity to show that this "good" 
reason is not the real reason but is a "pretext" for a discriminatory reason. For a discus-
sion of proof of intent in disparate treatment cases, see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EM-
PLOYMENT D1scRIMINATION LAW 1291-324 (2d ed. 1983). For a general discussion of the 
two theories of proof, see id. at 13-22 (disparate treatment), 80-205 (adverse impact). See 
also Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of 
Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972). As applied to wage discrimina-
tion, see Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 457-65. See also Blumrosen, Wage Dis-
crimination Revisited, 8 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 109, 120-22 (1984) [hereinafter Wage Dis-
crimination Revisited]. 
11. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; see also Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (disparate 
treatment); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (disparate impact). 
12. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983). 
13. The "two-stage trial" is outlined in Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360-62, and in 
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 614-15 (1984). See also Franks 
v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). 
14. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361. The Court stated: 
If an employer fails to rebut the inference that arises from the Government's 
prima facie case, a trial court may then conclude that a violation has occurred 
and determine the appropriate remedy. Without any further evidence from the 
Government [or private plaintiffs), a court's finding of a pattern or practice jus-
tifies an award of prospective relief. Such relief might take the form of an in-
junctive order against the continuation of the discriminatory practice ... or any 
other order "necessary to ensure the full enjoyment of the rights" protected by 
Title VII. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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fected pay for women's and minorities' jobs would normally be a 
question of remedy. Moreover, courts have repeatedly stated 
that the precise extent of discrimination need not be established 
under Title VII when the effects on women and minorities are 
apparent. 15 With respect to claims that wage discrimination was 
based on sex, however, many courts have assiduously required 
plaintiffs to prove, as part of the prima facie case, precisely 
"how much" sex discrimination affected the employer's wage 
rates. Requiring the quantum of damages to be proved as part of 
the liability determination places a much heavier burden on 
plaintiffs making wage discrimination claims based on sex than 
is appropriate in other kinds of Title VII cases.16 This burden 
has, in many instances, effectively cut off wage claims. Although 
such apparent hostility to sex-based wage claims may reflect lin-
gering judicial sex bias,17 it is more likely that the real problems 
15. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974); Rowe v. 
General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Bethlehem Steel 
Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971). 
16. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978). The burden on a 
plaintiff in a Title VII case is not "onerous": it is only necessary for the plaintiff to 
create an inference of discrimination. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 
U.S. 248, 253 (1981). For a discussion on precision in measuring discrimination and the 
standard of proof required, see Wage Discrimination Revisited, supra note 10, at 122-24. 
17. When Congress reviewed the administration of the sex provisions of Title VII 
during the process of adopting the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982), the speeches and reports particularly noted and con-
demned the initial hostility and suspicion with which both the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) and the lower courts had greeted the sex provisions of 
Title VII. Both the Senate and House reports underscored the seriousness with which 
Congress viewed the continuation of wage and job discrimination against women. The 
Senate report said: 
While some have looked at the entire issue of women's rights as a frivolous 
divertissement, this Committee believes that discrimination against women is no 
less serious than other prohibited forms of discrimination, and that it is to be 
accorded the same degree of concern given to any type of similarly unlawful 
conduct. 
S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971), reprinted in SuBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE 
SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 410, 416 (Comm. Print 1972) 
[hereinafter EEO HISTORY]. The House report recognized that both the EEOC and the 
courts had progressively begun to create a body of law disapproving of sex discrimination 
in employment, but that "discrimination against women continues to be widespread, and 
is regarded by many as either morally or physiologically justifiable." H.R. REP. No. 238, 
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971), reprinted in EEO HISTORY, supra, at 61, 65. The report 
particularly noted that "women's rights are not judicial divertissements. Discrimination 
against women is no less serious than other forms of prohibited employment practices 
and is to be accorded the same degree of social concern given to any type of unlawful 
discrimination." Id.; see also Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 486. 
The Supreme Court has likewise rejected interpretations undercutting the reach of the 
sex provision. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 
U.S. 702 (1978) (citing Griggs, a race discrimination case, in finding sex discrimination in 
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troubling the courts are the absence of an acceptable and man-
ageable remedy and the fear of becoming involved in a morass of 
economic theories about wage fixing. These fears are exaggerated 
and unrealistic. Although sex-based wage discrimination is a se-
rious and complex problem, it is no more intractable than the 
equally complex problems of revising discriminatory recruiting 
systems, testing systems, or seniority systems. 18 The courts have 
learned to handle these matters so effectively that they have lit-
erally changed the entire complexion of the work force. 19 
compensation); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (applying adverse effect test 
of Griggs to standards that had exclusionary effects on women, thus refuting the argu-
ment that the existence of the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense, Civil 
Rights Act § 703(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982), restricted the reach of the sex provi-
sions); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (rejecting a "sex-plus" 
analysis that would have required that sex be the sole cause of the discrimination in 
order for a claim to be actionable under Title VII, though no such limitation was in-
tended for race or other Title VII cases); see.also Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 
473-74. Phillips was specifically approved in the 1972 congressional reports. The Court 
has also given a broad reading to the Equal Pay Act, citing Griggs in Corning Glass 
Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974), the only Equal Pay Act case decided by the 
Court. When the Court did interpret the sex provision narrowly, see, e.g., General Elec. 
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), Congress immediately corrected that interpretation 
by passing the 1979 amendment to Title VII, the "Pregnancy Bill," Pub. L. No. 95-555, 
92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (amending Title VII to include pregnancy and childbirth within the 
prohibition against sex discrimination). See Wage Discrimination, supra note I, at 473 
n.276; see also Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 
(1983) (finding that Congress, by enacting the amendment, rejected the narrow test of 
discrimination derived from cases construing the fourteenth amendment that was em-
ployed by the Court in Gilbert). 
18. The basic employment practice that Title VII affected was restriction of access to 
jobs; "black jobs," "white jobs," "men's jobs," and "women's jobs" were openly recog-
nized. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 
U.S. 376 (1973) (male/female help wanted ads); Guardians Ass'n of the New York City 
Police Dep't v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1980) (testing), cert. denied, 452 
U.S. 940 (1981); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(steel industry seniority system), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Boston Chapter, 
NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d IOI 7 (1st Cir. 1974) (testing), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 
(1975); Gregory v. Litton Systems, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972) (arrest records); Local 
189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969) (seniority), cert. 
denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures 
(1978), 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (1986). See generally B. ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 10. 
19. Blumrosen, The Law Transmission System and the Southern Jurisprudence of 
Employment Discrimination, 6 INous. REL. L.J. 313 (1984) [hereinafter Law Transmis-
sion System]. In 1980, 2,461,140 minority workers, or 22.6% of the 10,890,000 minority 
workers, were in higher paying and higher status jobs than would have been the case if 
the occupational distribution of minorities were the same as it was in 1965. These work-
ers received nearly nine billion dollars more in wages than they would have had minority 
workers been distributed throughout the occupational categories in accordance with the 
pattern present in 1965. There has also been a substantial movement of women into 
formerly white male jobs. Of the 41,283,000 women in the work force in 1980, at least 
four million, or lO~i,, are in higher paying and higher status jobs than would be the case 
had the 1965 distribution of women workers remained in effect. These workers had a net 
increase of more than $21 billion over the income they would have received had that 
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One principle followed in Title VII cases is that once liability 
has been established, the defendant bears the risk of uncertainty 
as to the extent of liability.20 Uncertainty as to the amount of 
damages should not relieve wrongdoers of responsibility. Dam-
ages are assessed on the most reasonable basis available, and the 
wrongdoer should bear the risk of error arising from any uncer-
tainty. 21 The Fifth Circuit took this position, which is particu-
larly relevant in an action seeking an increase in future wages, in 
connection with uncertain back pay claims: 
The constant tendency of the court is to find some 
way in which damages can be awarded where a 
wrong has been done. Difficulty of ascertainment is 
no longer confused with right of recovery. 
Of course, many equitable considerations will enter into 
any resolution of entitlement, but- onerous and specula-
distribution remained. Id. at 330-40. This influx into traditionally white male jobs by 
both women and minorities is confirmed by H. HAMMERMAN, A DECADE OF NEW OPPORTU-
NITY (1984) (Potomac Institute Study) and U.S. CoMM'N ON C1v1L RIGHTS, COMPARABLE 
WORTH: AN ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14-15 (1985). Despite this substantial 
change, however, traditional women's and minorities' jobs continue to be occupied pre-
dominately by women and minorities. More than 99~,. of all secretaries and more than 
95~,. of all registered nurses are women, and more than 80~,. of all elementary school 
teachers and librarians are women. Id. at 16 (citing the U.S. Statistical Abstract: 1984, 
table 696). Women and minorities also tend to predominate in the lowest paying food 
and laundry service, clerical, and health care occupations. Salaries for these have tended 
to remain in the same relatively low position in the pay hierarchy. 
20. The law deals with uncertainty with two competing legal principles. One principle 
is that where damages are uncertain the court will not order recovery because there is 
not a sufficient basis to justify a recovery. This is generally the rule applied in contract 
cases. It is also at the heart of the argument of opponents to pay equity, which is that 
plaintiffs must establish, to a certainty, the extent to which discrimination has depressed 
their pay. The countervailing principle is that once liability has been established there 
should be a remedy. This is the principle most often followed in determining claims of a 
tortious nature as well as those of a federal right. See Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 
3000, 3009 (1986) ("A plaintiff in a Title VII suit need not prove discrimination with 
scientific certainty; rather, his burden is to prove discrimination by a preponderance of 
the evidence.") (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252). Bazemore held that the lower court 
erred in refusing to admit a multiple regression analysis that omitted variables thought 
to have an effect on salary level. Id. at 3007-11. 
21. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975): 
[W]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from 
the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the 
necessary relief .... [T]he [district) court has not merely the power but the duty 
to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory ef-
fects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future. 
(quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946), and Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 
145, 154 (1965)). 
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tive limitations should not be utilized as a bar to the res-
toration process. 22 
107 
Moreover, not all aspects of wage discrimination involve such 
uncertainties. When there is evidence-either direct or circum-
.stantial-of "evil motive" discrimination against an individual 
woman, courts have been willing to find discrimination, to assess 
damages, and to issue orders to eliminate future discriminatory 
pay. 23 Difficulties arise when it is not an individual who is un-
derpaid, but, instead, when a whole job classification is un-
derpaid because of the sex or race of the traditional occupants of 
that classification. Large employers rarely bargain with individu-
als about what they will be paid.24 The employer assigns a wage 
rate to a job classification. All who are assigned to the job cate-
gory get the same pay. 211 Here, the few men in the female job and 
the few white men in a "black job" receive the same rate for the 
job. The discrimination is against the job classification: the pay 
22. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1380 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(quoting Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 565-66 
(1931)) (citations and footnote omitted); see also Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 
F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978). For further discussion applying this general principle, see 
infra text accompanying note 109. 
23. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980) (pre-
Gunther case holding that intentionally paying a woman disproportionately less than the 
man she succeeded was a violation of Title VII). In Fitzgerald, the plaintiff's predecessor 
continued to do part of his former work on a freelance basis, so the plaintiff's job did not 
meet the Equal Pay Act standard for equal work. Because the court held that this kind 
of intentional discrimination was not covered by the Equal Pay Act, it could be tried 
under Title VII. See also Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1984) (office manager 
and subordinate paid about half of what male department heads received; plaintiffs re-
lied on informal and formal job evaluations, which the Board had refused to follow, and 
anecdotal evidence of other instances of sex discrimination); Carter v. Duncan-Huggins, 
Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (female bookmobile driver paid less than male deliv-
ery truck driver; evidence of similarity of jobs, history that jobs were sex~segregated, and 
that even the highest pay level for bookmobile drivers was less than the pay for a truck 
driver, regardless of how much seniority she accumulated); Taylor v. Charley Bros. Co., 
25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 602 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (sex-segregated warehouse jobs; 
history of only considering women job applicants for job in women's department; jobs of 
similar nature, though not "equal" under equal pay standard; employer had refused to 
evaluate the jobs). · 
24. At best, when individual bargaining does occur, it occurs within limits defined by 
the pay assigned to the job. There may be, at most, some leeway so that an individual 
may be able to bargain for a higher classification or job title, thus receiving higher pay. 
This is more likely at professional or managerial levels. Lower level jobs, including al-
most all jobs traditionally considered to be women's or minorities' jobs, rarely have even 
this degree of flexibility of compensation. The employer usually has a vacancy in a job 
with a defined job description and defined pay. The applicant generally must take it or 
leave it. 
25. The situation is, therefore, not covered by the Equal Pay Act, which reaches only 
those situations in which men and women are working on the same job but are being 
paid differently. 
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determinations are still governed by the sex or race of those with 
whom the job classification is associated. The underpayment is a 
direct result of the fact that the job classification is, for pay pur-
poses, treated as if it were still segregated. Indeed, often the job 
rate was set at a time-not long ago-when the employer was 
deliberately segregating the job.26 The discrimination is sys-
temic27 as well as systematic. Such cases are inherently class ac-
tions, and the remedy should realign the pay of the job classifi-
cation. Everyone working in that classification has been harmed 
by decisions tainted by race or sex. The remedy should run to 
the classification in order to eliminate future underpayment of 
the job based on race or sex. 
Discrimination against the job classification is not always eas-
ily recognized because it does not involve actions taken against 
discrete identifiable individuals. Recognition of this form of dis-
crimination requires acceptance of the view that wages are set 
by large employers as part of a system of employee relations 
that may be impersonal and free of bias directed against individ-
uals, yet may still discriminate. This view evolved under the in-
terpretations of the 1964 Act and was explicitly approved in 
committee reports leading up to the 1972 Amendments to Title 
v11.2s 
26. See Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000, 3006 (1986) (concluding that salary dis-
parities based on race created prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act and perpet-
uated into the post-Act period constitute a violation of Title VII). The Court stated: 
Id. 
A pattern or practice that would have constituted a violation of Title VII, but 
for the fact that the statute had not yet become effective, became a violation 
upon Title VII's effective date, and to the extent an employer continued to en-
gage in that act or practice, he is liable under that statute. 
27. For further discussion of how job classification, evaluation, and compensation sys-
tems are designed and operate, see infra text accompanying note 59. For the need to 
develop a "technical perception" of industrial relations systems, see infra note 28. 
28. S. REP. No. 415, supra note 17, at 5, reprinted in EEO HISTORY, supra note 17, at 
414; H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 17, at 8-9, reprinted in EEO HISTORY, supra note 17, 
at 68-69. Both the House and Senate reports contained similar language to explain why 
the EEOC needed enforcement powers. The House report said: 
During the preparation and presentation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a series of isolated and 
distinguishable events, due, for the most part, to ill-will on the part of some 
identifiable individual or organization .... 
Employment discrimination, as we know today, is a far more complex and per-
vasive phenomenon. Experts familiar with the subject generally describe the 
problem in terms of "systems" and "effects" rather than simply intentional 
wrongs. The literature on the subject is replete with discussions of the mechan-
ics of seniority and lines of progression, perpetuation of the present effects of 
earlier discriminatory practices through various institutional devices, and testing 
and validation requirements. The forms and incidents of discrimination which 
the Commission is required to treat are increasingly complex. Particularly to the 
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Thus, the key to wage discrimination against job classifica-
tions is that the jobs are segregated, and that the identity of the 
job as female or minority is preserved by the employer when 
classifying and grading jobs for pay purposes. The wrong done 
through segregation of jobs is not only denial of promotion op-
portunities; it is that each person in the job class is continually 
subjected to the discriminatorily depressed wage rate. 
For many victims of discriminatory assignments, relief from 
wage discrimination will be the only effective remedy because of 
the legal or practical unavailability or inadequacy of the promo-
tional remedy. 29 There are at least four reasons why the opening 
of job opportunities and back pay are not adequate remedies, 
even where the segregation of the job classification resulted from 
discriminatory job assignments. First, such remedies depend on 
the opening of vacancies in higher paying jobs. These vacancies 
may not be available when needed and, in static or declining in-
dustries, may never become available. Second, the number of va-
cancies will rarely equal the number of claimants, for there are 
usually fewer places as one moves up the job pyramid. Third, 
the underlying interests and qualifications of the plaintiffs may 
have changed during the years of working in segregated jobs. 
Whatever might have been the case at the time of their initial 
assignment, the workers may no longer be interested, or perhaps 
qualified, for those jobs they might have held but for the dis-
criminatory assignment. They have also probably missed out on 
training opportunities that would have been available had they 
not been discriminatorily assigned to the segregated job. Fourth, 
the Supreme Court decision in International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters v. United States30 sharply restricts the situations in 
which promotional opportunity remedies can be granted at all. 
untrained observer, their discriminatory nature may not appear obvious at first 
glance .... 
It is increasingly obvious that the entire area of employment discrimination is 
one whose resolution requires not only expert assistance, but also the technical 
perception that a problem exists in the first place, and that the system com-
plained of is unlawful. 
Id. at 8, reprinted in EEO HISTORY at 68 (footnote omitted). 
29. See Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 491. 
30. 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (holding that the § 703(h) seniority exception of Title VII, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982), protects seniority systems that are not designed or intended 
to discriminate). Prior to Teamsters, most courts of appeals had applied the effects test 
to seniority systems to hold that departmental seniority systems that locked women or 
minorities into historically segregated departments were illegal. The remedy allowed 
women and minorities to use plantwide seniority to claim promotional opportunities in 
previously all white or male departments. Teamsters thus cut off this movement of 
women and minorities into their "rightful places." 
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In addition to the direct victims of discriminatory assignment, 
there may be others who, in theory, might have gone into an-
other occupation, but who in reality had little choice but to take 
an available job. Although the employer may claim that all jobs 
are open to everyone, at any particular time the employer may 
well be hiring women and minorities only into traditionally f e-
male or minority jobs. Applicants for these jobs rarely have 
much bargaining power because they are women and minorities 
in need of a job. When they accept a position for which the pay 
was set at a time when the job was segregated, or through meth-
ods that take into account the race or sex of those normally do-
ing the job, they suffer the adverse effects of segregation just as 
surely as those the employer deliberately segregated into that 
job classification. 31 For others who have invested time and 
money to become skilled in work highly valued by society, but 
nevertheless ill-paid, changing jobs is no answer. They do not 
want a man's job; they just want to be paid fairly for the work 
they do. 32 The nature of an individual's job influences individual 
dignity and the status others are willing to accord it because 
31. Opponents of pay equity who claim that the low pay for such women's jobs is due 
to the choices women made to enter those fields, rather than male fields, are simply 
ignoring the long history of pervasive discrimination and restrictions that have defined 
and confined women's roles to those expected or thought proper for women. See Wage 
Discrimination, supra note 1, at 402-08. This history has deeply affected the demand 
side of the labor market. It tends to shape the way men-it has usually been white men 
who make the hiring and pay decisions-think about jobs suitable for a woman. The 
same kind of history of discrimination influences perceptions about minorities. Such 
"supply siders" are simply playing "blame the victim," see E. BERNE, GAMES PEOPLE 
PLAY (1964). The Civil Rights Commission report, see supra note 19, is another recent 
example of this supply-side approach. 
32. The harmful effect of occupational segregation on depressed pay was addressed 
by the Supreme Court in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 
(1982). In Hogan, a male sought to gain admission to an all-female nursing school. Jus-
tice O'Connor, writing for the Court, cautioned against permitting gender-based classifi-
cation based on stereotypical notions of the roles of men and women. She highlighted the 
history of women's exclusion from a wide spectrum of employment opportunities, rang-
ing from admission to the legal profession to tending bar. She then noted that while 
denying entry to men may have helped maintain a female monopoly in nursing, it served 
to perpetuate the stereotypical view of nursing as women's work, which, far from serving 
to benefit women professionally, was thought to have depressed nurses' wages. Id. at 729 
& n.15; see also Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) (dismissing 
the employer's claim that because segregating stewardess jobs benefited women, weight 
restriction rules that applied only to that classification were not discriminatory), cert. 
dismissed, 460 U.S. 1074 (1983). Moreover, the contention that wages in many men's 
occupations are higher because of collective bargaining often is another example of 
"blaming the victim," see supra note 31. The implication is that if women wanted higher 
pay and better treatment, they should have organized. This contention ignores the fact 
that negotiating power in collective bargaining ultimately depends on the power to 
strike. It is thus ironic that teachers, nurses, and other health care workers-all in pre-
dominately female and minority occupations-were among the few workers that, almost 
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work defines one's role in society. The value of that role is re-
lated to the wages that work commands. Discrimination that cir-
cumscribes opportunity and defines the status of women and mi-
norities through low pay for the work they do harms both 
dignitary and economic interests. 33 
II. THREE POSSIBLE REMEDIES FOR THREE DIFFERENT 
PATTERNS OF DISCRIMINATORY WAGE SETTING 
Although understanding an employer's wage-setting system 
sufficiently to devise appropriate remedies may be difficult, it is 
unnecessary to wrestle with abstract macroeconomic labor mar-
ket theories in the usual case. The search for a remedy should 
start in the employer's own wage-setting practices. The goal 
under Title VII is not to make all jobs pay "what they are 
worth"; it is to eliminate wage discrimination. Because the ob-
jective is to remedy discrimination, not necessarily to make the 
employer's system in general operate fairly, an appropriate rem-
edy need only cure the practices that have been identified as 
factors depressing pay for women's or minorities' jobs. Thus, the 
proof of discrimination often points the way to the remedy. 34 
Hidden in the interstices of compensation systems, there may 
be many specific practices, mechanisms, and design features that 
either deliberately or opportunistically result in low wages for 
jobs held predominately by women and minorities. 311 One ap-
proach to identifying and remedying the discriminatory prac-
tices would be to dissect the employer's wage-setting system to 
determine the precise ways in which the underpayment is ac-
complished. This process would subject employers to extensive 
discovery.36 Such discriminatory practices, however, leave finger-
prints: distinctive patterns that can be more easily identified 
universally, were prohibited from striking on the grounds that their work was so impor-
tant to society that a cessation of their services would be unthinkable. 
33. See generally K. AuLE'ITA, THE UNDERCLASS (1982). 
34. See Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 492; Blumrosen & Blumrosen, The 
Duty to Plan for Fair Employment Revisited: Work Sharing in Hard Times, 28 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1082, 1101 (1975). 
35. See infra note 77 (discussing some of the discrete practices found in New Jersey 
that had resulted in underpayment for most women's and minorities' job classifications). 
36. Cf. Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077 
(1965). Professor Cowan suggests that one policy base underlying the move to strict 
product liability law is found in the desire of large producers to keep plaintiffs' experts 
out of their plants. This, he suggests, may make implied warranty or strict liability more 
in their overall interest than are actions bas.ed on negligence. 
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and remedied than if all the discrete decisions of which they are 
composed had to be examined. This approach has been taken by 
the Supreme Court in other Title VII cases. 37 
Three patterns are now foreseeable consequences of discrimi-
natory wage setting. These are: first, when the employer has es-
tablished the extent of the injury; second, when women's and 
minorities' jobs are clustered below the entry-level pay for white 
unskilled labor; and third, when a violation of the Equal Pay Act 
has occurred. These three situations encompass most of the typ-
ical kinds of wage discrimination likely to be found in large em-
ployers. Each can be remedied within parameters derived from 
the employer's own wage-setting systems. 
By concentrating on the end result of discriminatory employ-
ment practices, a remedy in wage discrimination cases that only 
addresses the harm done will simplify the task of a court and 
eliminate much of the fear of interfering unduly with manage-
ment decisionmaking and of wage fixing in general. Such narrow 
remedies adhere to the general policy of judicial restraint fol-
lowed in other kinds of discrimination cases. 38 The result of such 
judicial restraint may be to spur employers and unions to de-
velop better systems that will both eliminate discrimination and 
achieve more equitable compensation.39 
37. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). The Court 
said: 
[A]t the liability stage of a pattern-or-practice trial the focus often will not be on 
individual hiring decisions, but on a pattern of discriminatory decisionmaking. 
While a pattern might be demonstrated by examining the discrete decisions of 
which it is composed, the Government's suits have more commonly involved 
proof of the expected result of a regularly followed discriminatory policy. In such 
cases the employer's burden is to provide a nondiscriminatory explanation for 
the apparently discriminatory result. 
Id. at 360 n.46. Teamsters was an "intentional discrimination" case. The same analysis 
applies in "disparate impact" cases. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
Where the components of a discriminatory practice include subjective judgments-a fac-
tor common in wage discrimination cases-an issue arises as to whether these judgments 
are properly subject to the disparate impact principle. Compare Atonio v. Wards Cove 
Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (holding that disparate impact 
analysis may be applied to subjective employment practices) with Pouncy v. Prudential 
Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that the disparate impact analysis 
does not apply to evaluations of employees based on subjective criteria). See Blumrosen, 
The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments, Cm.-KENT L. REV. 
(forthcoming). 
38. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971) 
(requiring that blacks be allowed to use plantwide seniority in competing with whites, 
but leaving the seniority rights of whites vis-a-vis each other on a departmental basis). 
39. In cases such as Bethlehem Steel, judges narrowly defined their remedial power. 
They gave "black only" remedies that resulted in dual-seniority systems, which created 
considerable tensions. Although such remedies tended to put the injured black workers 
in their "rightful place," they wreaked havoc in the rest of the system. These "black 
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In developing remedies in a new area, one source of practical 
instruction is to examine what is done by employers and unions 
in developing good industrial relations practices. The exper-
iences in Minnesota and New Jersey illustrate the first two most 
common situations a court might need to remedy. These states 
are fairly typical of most large employers, both public and pri-
vate, in the way they determine what they will pay their employ-
ees. •0 Like most large employers, they use job evaluation systems 
to rank jobs and to group jobs requiring similar degrees of par-
ticular qualities together into pay grades. These job evaluation 
systems constitute the employer's "value system." The em-
ployer, in adopting a job evaluation system, indicates precisely 
for what it is paying. Moreover, in these states, as for most large 
employers, the distribution of men and women, and of whites 
and minorities through the occupational levels of the work force 
tend to be similar; and similar jobs tend to be ranked and paid 
in similar patterns. The proof of discrimination in the two 
states, however, is different. Most large employers will be like 
one or the other. 
only" remedies are credited for spurring the steel industry employers and the United 
Steelworkers to develop a system that would correct their discriminatory seniority sys-
tems in a way they could live with. The result was the steel industry consent decree 
(later copied for the aluminum industry), which revamped the industry's seniority sys-
tem for all covered workers throughout the industry. It altered the departmental senior-
ity system and gave decisive weight to plant seniority for blacks and whites alike. It also 
opened training opportunities to both white and black workers that would otherwise not 
have existed for anyone. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (uphold-
ing the legality of a race- and sex-specific skilled training program, designed to improve 
opportunities for women and minorities, which was also open to whites). An account of 
the effect of narrow court remedies in spurring "voluntary action" in the steel industry is 
discussed in Law Transmission System, supra note 19, which draws heavily on two pa-
pers delivered at the Rutgers University Equal Employment Opportunity Symposium, 
November 28-29, 1975: B. Fischer, Evaluating the Steel Industry Consent Decree, and 
G. Moore, Steel Industry Consent Decrees-A Model for the Future? The Moore paper 
was revised and published as Moore, Steel Industry Consent Decrees-A Model for the 
Future?, 3 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 214 (1977). 
40. New Jersey may be atypical only because the state civil service personnel have 
been more aware than most employers of possible discriminatory pitfalls and had elimi-
nated, before a commission study, many of the more obvious kinds of discrimination 
from their pay practices. NEW JERSEY COMM'N ON SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE STATUTES, 
AN ANALYSIS OF WAGE DISCRIMINATION IN NEW JERSEY STATE SERVICE (1983) [hereinafter 
N.J. ANALYSIS]. 
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A. When the Employer Has Established the Extent of the 
Injury 
Journal of Law Reform 
The manifestation of discrimination identified in Minnesota is 
easier to understand and to cure than that in New Jersey.41 It is 
also probably more typical of large employers who have job eval-
uation and compensation systems than is the New Jersey sys-
tem. Minnesota-like many other states and private employ-
ers-employed a formal job evaluation system,42 but there was 
little relationship, for women's jobs, between the formal job 
evaluation system and the compensation schedule. Women's jobs 
consistently were paid less than men's jobs with the same num-
ber of job evaluation points.43 The state employer had thus put 
its own value on positions covered by the classification/compen-
sation system but had not applied the system in the same way to 
men's and women's jobs. The facts are thus similar to those 
presented to the United States Supreme Court in County of 
Washington v. Gunther."' In Gunther, women jail matrons 
claimed their pay was depressed because of sex discrimination. 
They contended that the county had evaluated their jobs, that 
the county determined they should be paid ninety-five percent 
as much as the male correctional officers, that after a community 
wage survey, however, it paid them only about seventy percent 
as much, and that the failure of the county to pay the full evalu-
ated worth of their jobs was attributable to intentional sex dis-
crimination. The Supreme Court denied that "the pay structure 
of virtually every employer and the entire economy" would be 
"subject to scrutiny by the federal courts" if it recognized this as 
discrimination and approved this kind. of proof because, as the 
Court said, the "respondents' suit does not require a court to 
make its own subjective assessment of the value of the male and 
41. Many employers rate jobs according to their job evaluation system, but then do 
not pay accordingly. This was the problem in Minnesota, but not in New Jersey. In New 
Jersey, the evaluated points determined the pay grade, but the pay patterns were the 
same as in states where there was a discrepancy between evaluated points and pay. Id. 
at 4-6. 
42. COMMISSION ON THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF WOMEN, PAY EQUITY: THE MINNESOTA 
EXPERIENCE 9 (1985) [hereinafter MINNESOTA REPORT). 
43. Id. at 13. 
44. 452 U.S. 161 (1981). The Court held that a Title VII claim of wage discrimination 
based on sex will lie even though men's and women's jobs are too dissimilar to meet the 
"equal work" standard of the Equal Pay Act. This case opened the door for Title VII 
claims of wage discrimination, but also left many questions about the nature and order 
of the proof and the allocation of the burdens of proof appropriate for wage discrimina-
tion claims based on sex. 
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female guard jobs, or to attempt by statistical technique or other 
method to quantify the effect of sex discrimination on the wage 
rates."•11 
Thus, when an employer like Minnesota has evaluated jobs, 
then pays men "the full evaluated worth of their jobs" but pays 
women or minorities less than the full evaluation of theirs, at 
least when the different treatment can be attributed to sex dis-
crimination, 46 courts following the approach of the Supreme 
45. Id. at 180-81 (1981) (citation and footnote omitted). 
46. One major question not addressed by Gunther goes directly to the definition of 
"sex discrimination." It is unclear whether there must be proof of intentional discrimina-
tion (disparate treatment) or whether a case of disparate impact may also be used to 
prove sex-based wage discrimination. In Gunther, the plaintiffs only claimed intentional 
sex discrimination, and most commentators and courts that have addressed the question 
agree that intentional discrimination can be challenged in a Title VII suit although there 
is some disagreement on what kinds of proof are appropriate. Cf. American Nurses' Ass'n 
v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986); Connecticut State Employees Ass'n v. Connecti-
cut, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 191 (D. Conn. 1983); EEOC v. Hay Assocs., 545 
F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1982). For a discussion of possible prima facie cases, see Wage 
Discrimination Revisited, supra note 10, at 120-21, 124-28. 
Some commentators point to the emphasis in Gunther on the necessity for "the broad 
approach" to the definition of equal employment opportunity "essential to overcoming 
and undoing the effect of discrimination," Gunther, 452 U.S. at 178, for sex-based wage 
discrimination claims as for other claims of discrimination to argue that proof of discrim-
ination should be treated in the same way for all groups, and that claims may be founded 
either on intentional discrimination (disparate treatment) or on the adverse effects of 
facially neutral practices (disparate impact). See, e.g., Wage Discrimination Revisited, 
supra note 10, at 118-20; Comment, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Under the Title 
VII Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1083 (1982). Section 703(a)(l) of Title 
VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982), is usually considered the source of the disparate 
treatment theory requiring a showing of discriminatory intent, although some courts 
have also held that a disparate impact theory will lie in a § 703(a)(l) claim of discrimina-
tion "with respect to ... compensation," id. See Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 705 F.2d 
1492 (9th Cir. 1983) (employer's head-of-household rule), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 
(1984); Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 697 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that 
preferences in wages, hours, and assignments to members of founding families have an 
adverse impact on blacks and Hispanics), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984); Kouba v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982) (examining a compensation scheme that 
used prior salary as a factor in determining commission sales agents' minimum monthly 
salary). On the other hand, the Third Circuit found that Westinghouse had violated 
§ 703(a)(2) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1982), by segregating and then inten-
tionally classifying women's jobs to deny women employment opportunity-i.e., better 
pay. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 
631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981). See Wage Discrimina-
tion, supra note 1, for a discussion of why wage discrimination is a foreseeable conse-
quence of segregation and thus violates both provisions of § 703. Cases in which courts 
have allowed statistical evidence of the failure of employers to follow their own job eval-
uations as probative evidence of wage discrimination include Wilkins v. University of 
Houston, 654 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1981) (where 18 of 21 persons paid less than the mini-
mum pay established for their jobs under a pay structure based on a job evaluation were 
women), vacated, 459 U.S. 809 (1982); and Heagney v. University of Washington, 642 
F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that it was reversible error to exclude evidence of job 
evaluation results that the University followed in its compensation to males but not fe-
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Court can order the compensation for the women's and minori-
ties' jobs raised so that all jobs evaluated the same will be paid 
the same.47 
males). Other commentators have read Gunther as restricting wage discrimination in 
segregated jobs to instances where intent is shown. See, e.g., Cox, Equal Work, Compa-
rable Worth and Disparate Treatment: An Argument for Narrowly Construing County 
of Washington v. Gunther, 22 DuQ. L. REV. 65 (1983). This is the view the U.S. Civil 
Rights Commission favors. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 57, 71 
(finding no. 14). 
While no courts have allowed a claim based solely on a comparison of jobs too dissimi-
lar to meet the Equal Pay Act standard for equal work, some have indicated that such a 
claim might lie. E.g., Hay Assocs., 545 F. Supp. at 1064 (holding that comparable worth 
claims, defined as equal salary for work that differs in content but is equally valuable to 
the work performed by men in another job, are cognizable under Title VII). Several 
courts have indicated that though such comparisons alone would not state a cause of 
action under Title VII, they might be relevant evidence of intentional discrimination. 
See, e.g., Power v. Barry County, Mich., 539 F. Supp. 721 (W.D. Mich. 1982); Gerlack v. 
Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 501 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Mich. 1980). One court has suggested 
that a showing of comparable worth might be required to raise an inference of discrimi-
nation. Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982); see also Plemer v. 
Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that only a disparate treatment 
claim is a cognizable Title VII wage claim, but that statistical evidence is relevant on the 
question of pretext); Taylor v. Charley Bros. Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 602 
(W.D. Pa. 1981) (concluding that plaintiffs' job evaluation expert's testimony on similar-
ity of jobs and disproportionate wage differential is probative evidence of discrimination 
and that the employer's refusal to conduct a job evaluation is evidence of intent); cf. 
American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 606 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (granting motion to 
dismiss for failure to show cause of action and holding that the State's failure to pay 
according to the results of a state-funded job evaluation was not actionable), rev'd on 
other grounds, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986). 
47. Some recent decisions have not followed the Supreme Court's example and have 
not found violations even when an employer pays women less than its own evaluation of 
the worth of their jobs. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have distinguished Gunther 
despite similarity of factual claims. American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th 
Cir. 1986); AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985); Spaulding v. Univer-
sity of Wash., 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984). In AFSCME, 
the State of Washington, in 1974, had done the first "comparable worth study." N. WIL-
LIS & Assocs., STATE OF WASHINGTON COMPARABLE WORTH STUDY (1974) [hereinafter 
WASHINGTON STUDY). The study showed women's positions were paid, on average, 20~,. 
Jess than the evaluated value. Despite a state surplus, the study was not implemented 
before litigation was initiated. The district court found intentional discrimination, inter 
alia, because the State had not taken steps to remedy the underpayment, and also found 
that the compensation practice of paying the market price had an illegal disparate im-
pact on women. The court of appeals reversed on both grounds, relying on Spaulding. In 
Spaulding, the court had held that although the University practice of setting pay for 
faculty departments based on the market price for practitioners of the discipline had a 
disparate impact on the school of nursing, it was not the kind of employment practice 
contemplated by Griggs. The court said that employers are "takers" of the market price, 
not decisionmakers about pay. To reach this decision, the court distinguished salary de-
terminations from fringe benefit determinations, which both the Supreme Court and the 
Ninth Circuit had held violated the Title VII prohibition against discrimination in com-
pensation, Arizona Governing Comm'n v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983); City of Los Ange-
les Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Wambheim v. J.C. Penney 
Co., 705 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984); Bonilla v. Oakland 
Scavenger Co., 697 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984). Spauld-
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The Minnesota Task Force on Pay Equity attributed much of 
the discrepancy between points and pay to reliance on prevailing 
wage rates that overrode the evaluations.48 The Task Force iden-
tified this practice, which resulted in underpaying women's jobs, 
as discriminatory. The Minnesota legislature agreed."9 One rem-
edy for this form of wage discrimination is to raise the women's 
salaries so that all jobs evaluated alike are paid alike.110 Such a 
ing relied in part for its conclusion that Griggs was inapplicable to wage discrimination 
claims on Pouncy v. Prudential Insurance Co., 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982), see Spauld-
ing, 740 F.2d at 707. The Ninth Circuit, en bane, rejected the reasoning in Pouncy in 
Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987), which held that a 
variety of employment practices that included the subjective judgments of the employer 
were subject to the disparate impact concept of discrimination. This is crucial in wage 
discrimination cases because the process of wage setting as practiced in American indus-
try involves, at bottom, a range of subjective judgments concerning the valuation of the 
job. See Wage Discrimination, supra note 1. Although American Nurses' Association 
found that the "principal practice ... instanced as intentional sex discrimination [in the 
complaint]-the employer's failure to implement comparable worth-is lawful," 783 F.2d 
at 727, the court held that where allegations can be read into the complaint that an 
employer intentionally depressed wages or classified employees by sex, the complaint 
should not be dismissed. The court's position that "proof of this causality is essential 
and is not to be inferred merely from the results of a comparable worth study and from 
the refusal of the employer to implement the study's recommendations," id. at 730, 
seems to suggest that evidence of failure to follow a job evaluation would not constitute 
evidence of an intent to discriminate, nor even of the employer's assessment of the value 
of male and female jobs. Cf. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 180-81; see also supra text accompany-
ing note 45. 
48. MINNESOTA REPORT, supra note 42, at 11-13. Minnesota law required the State to 
pay employees the prevailing wage rate. MINN. STAT. § 43.111 (1980) (repealed 1981). 
49. Acting as an employer, the legislature ordered the State's pay system to be re-
vamped to ensure that jobs would be valued and paid according to the same criteria, i.e., 
skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions. State Employees Pay Equity Act, ch. 
634, § 3, 1982 Minn. Laws 1559, 1559 (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 43A.02(14a) (West 
Supp. 1987)). The internal valuation was to be given priority over market rates in case of 
a conflict. Comparable worth would be a bargaining issue for personnel engaged in collec-
tive bargaining, and the legislature committed itself to provide n1oney as a "set aside" in 
addition to regular salary increases with a goal of pay equity within five years. Now in its 
fifth year, the system has been so satisfactory that in 1984 the Minnesota legislature 
required all political subdivisions to review their pay practices and to correct any inequi-
ties. Local Government Pay Equity Act, ch. 651, 1984 Minn. Laws 1896 (codified as 
amended at MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 471.991-.999 (West Supp. 1987)). See generally MINNE-
SOTA REPORT, supra note 42; Rothchild, Pay Equity-The Minnesota Experience, 20 U. 
MICH. J.L. REF. 209 (1986). 
50. The Federal Government's General Schedule is an example of a compensation 
plan in which the evaluation of a job classification determines the pay grade for that 
classification, i.e., thus determining where the job fits into the salary structure. In the 
federal classified system, there are now 18 classified grades, 5 U.S.C. § 5332 (1982 & 
Supp. Ill 1985), and five political ones. Some blue collar jobs are not included in the 
general schedule. These are paid the local prevailing wage rate, which has generally 
meant the union wage rate. New Jersey likewise determines pay range strictly by job 
evaluation score. See generally DEP'T OF PERSONNEL, STATE OF NEW JERSEY COMPENSA-
TION SCHEDULES (1986) [hereinafter N.J. COMPENSATION SCHEDULES). In these systems, at 
least in theory, there is a consistent relationship between job evaluations and pay range. 
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remedy would be appropriate for a court to order. The employer 
has already determined what the jobs are "worth." The extent to 
which sex discrimination depressed the pay for women's jobs has 
thus already been defined by the employer. The extent of dam-
ages is not speculative, and a court can order future payment of 
the "proper" wages, pursuant to the employer's own evaluation. 
It is appropriate to raise the women's wages, not to lower the 
men's. The employer has determined the "proper" wage for that 
score by what it pays the male jobs. Even if this is perceived as 
favoring men, rather than discriminating against women or mi-
norities, the result is that the jobs associated with women or mi-
norities are being treated less favorably than the male jobs. The 
remedy is to eliminate the less favorable treatment. Thus, future 
pay should be at the male rate. This is consonant with the rem-
edy mandated in the Equal Pay Act and may be required under 
Title VII by the Bennett Amendment. '11 At least two courts have 
51. The Equal Pay Act states: "Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage 
rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the 
provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee." 29 U.S.C. 
§ 206(d)(l) (1982). 
In Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974), the Court explained: 
The purpose of this proviso was to ensure that to remedy violations of the Act, 
"[t)he lower wage rate must be increased to the level of the higher." ... Com-
ments of individual legislators are all consistent with this view. Representative 
Dwyer remarked, for example, "The objective of equal pay legislation ... is not 
to drag down men workers to the wage levels of women, but to raise women to 
the levels enjoyed by men in cases where discrimination is still practiced." Rep-
resentative Griffin also thought it clear that "[t]he only way a violation could be 
remedied under the bill ... is for the lower wages to be raised to the higher." 
Id. at 207 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963); 109 CONG. REC. 2714 
(1963); Hearings on Equal Pay Act Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House 
Comm. on Education and Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1963)) (alterations in original). 
The Bennett Amendment states: 
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this title for any em-
ployer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the 
wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such 
differentiation is authorized by the provisions of [the Equal Pay Act). 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982). The Bennett Amendment became the last sentence in the 
exception section of Title VII, § 703(h), id. Opponents of pay equity had argued that the 
Bennett Amendment required that Title VII claims of wage discrimination based on sex 
be restricted to those that could also be brought. under the Equal Pay Act, and thus that 
claims not arising from equal work were prohibited. This line of argument met with 
considerable success in the lower courts. See Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 469 
n.257 (discussing cases that accepted this argument). In Gunther, however, the Supreme 
Court put this line of reasoning to rest, holding that only the four affirmative defenses of 
the Equal Pay Act were "authorized" and thus incorporated into Title VII. The Court 
also noted that the Bennett Amendment was "designed to resolve any potential conflicts 
between Title VII and the Equal Pay Act." 452 U.S. at 170. The argument would be that 
the Equal Pay Act specifically forbids lowering pay in order to equalize wage rates while 
Title VII is silent; therefore, allowing lowering of wages as a remedy under Title VII 
FALL 1986) Remedies for Wage Discrimination 119 
held that the requirement that the Equal Pay Act and Title VII 
be read in pari materia means that the principle of the Equal 
Pay proviso prohibits lowering compensation where a violation 
of Title VII has been found. 112 More recently, when the New 
Jersey legislature mandated that wage discrimination in state 
service be eliminated, lowering wages was specifically prohib-
ited. 113 Thus, when the employer has established the extent of 
the injury, the remedy is to link compensation levels to the em-
ployer's own estimate of job evaluation levels-to raise the pay 
of the underpaid classifications so that the same number of eval-
uation points results in the same amount of pay. 
Minnesota, for political reasons, took a somewhat different 
tack to resolve the same problem-that women's job classes were 
consistently paid less than the men's jobs evaluated the same. 
Most of the job classes in Minnesota state service are included 
in one of the sixteen bargaining units that negotiate wages. 114 
This, in part, explained why job classes evaluated the same were 
paid differently. 1111 It did not explain the consistent pattern of 
lower pay for women's jobs than for men's, "even when the two 
jobs are at the same point level. "116 
would be in conflict with the intention of Congress expressed in the Equal Pay Act, 
which the Bennett Amendment was designed to prevent. 
52. Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973); Hays v. Pot-
latch Forests, 465 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1972). 
53. Act approved Oct. 17, 1984, ch. 166, § 3(e), 1984 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 148, 150 
(West) (No. 6). 
54. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.10(2) (West Supp. 1987). 
55. The Minnesota Task Force on Pay Equity found that not only were women's jobs 
not paid the same as similarly rated men's jobs, but, at any point on the job evaluation 
scale, not all men's jobs were paid the same. MINNESOTA REPORT, supra note 42. The 
Task Force attributed some of the justifiable differences to collective bargaining and re-
cruitment problems. Id. at 13. For instance, General Repair Worker (m), rated at 134 
Hay job evaluation points, is paid a maximum monthly salary of $1564. This is not only 
higher than any of the 10 largest female job classes; it is also more than a male job rated 
154. Similarly, a male job at 238 points was paid about $100 less a month than another 
male job rated 206. Id. at 20 (app. I). Despite such differences, the Task Force found 
that "[f]or the system as a whole, there is a positive correlation between evaluation 
points and pay-that is, jobs with higher point values generally receive higher pay than 
jobs with lower point values." Id. at 11. 
56. Id. at 11. Of the 10 largest male and female jobs in 1981, no female job paid as 
well as any male job. The 10 female jobs ranged from Clerk Typist 1, rated at 100 points, 
with a top monthly salary of $1039, to Licensed Practical Nurse 2, rated 183, paid $1382. 
The male jobs ranged from General Repair Worker, rated 134, paid $1564, to Engineer 
Principal, rated 479, paid $2923. More pertinently, the Correctional Counselor 2 male 
job, rated 188-only 5 Hay points more than the nurse-got $1656, over $250 more per 
month. Id. at 20 (app. I). For matched pairs: at 117 points the male job's pay was $1382, 
the female, $1115; at 129, male $1505, female $1202; at 173, male $1693, female $1343; at 
199, male $1834, female $1373. Id. Note that not only are the women paid lower, but the 
pay spread is tighter. Although there is more than $200 difference between the male jobs 
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Minnesota had, in fact, a dual wage system.117 The dual nature 
of the compensation scheme became visually apparent when an-
alyzed using schematic scattergrams and a simple statistical 
technique that estimates the line of best fit between wages and 
point scores. This visually defines a pay line for the male and 
female jobs. The Minnesota Task Force analyzed the compensa-
tion schedule in this way, graphically demonstrating that there 
were, in fact, separate pay lines for male- and female-dominated 
jobs.118 
The remedy for discrimination analyzed in this way is to elim-
inate the dual wage structure. The female line would be raised 
rated 173 and 199, respectively, there is only about $30 difference between the female 
jobs at those ratings. 
57. Because the Minnesota legislature required payment of "prevailing wages," see 
supra note 48, and this had been interpreted to require prevailing wage rates to override 
job evaluations, a dual wage system could have been anticipated. It is, in fact, a well-
known phenomenon among compensation specialists. One job evaluation consultant em-
phasizes to clients that there is a good deal of dispersion in wage rates in the market: 
that there is a market rate for female-dominated jobs and a second market rate for male-
dominated jobs. OREGON TASK FORCE ON STATE COMPENSATION AND CLASSIFICATION EQ-
UITY, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SIXTY THIRD LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 
30 (1985) [hereinafter OREGON REPORT]. Thus, the foreseeable consequence of a policy of 
paying prevailing wages for sex- or race-segregated jobs is an adverse effect on women 
and minorities, precisely the kind of employment practice explicitly prohibited by the 
clear language of Civil Rights Act § 703(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1982). It should 
therefore be considered violative of Title VII, unless the employer can show that the 
higher wages for the male jobs were necessary because of skill shortages, or, alternatively, 
the employer utilizes the prevailing male rates as the measure of value for all jobs evalu-
ated alike. 
58. MINNESOTA REPORT, supra note 42, at 12. A simple linear regression is the main 
statistical tool currently used to identify inequities and to describe current pay practices. 
The "line of best fit," "line of central tendency," or "trend line" estimates the central 
tendency that underlies the data and is considered the best predictor of wages for any 
given point score. To illustrate the results graphically, each male and female job is plot-
ted on a chart called a scattergram, according to pay on the vertical axis and evaluation 
points on the horizontal. The "trend line" is determined and drawn. The existence of not 
a single line, but of two lines-one organizing the male jobs, the other the fe-
male-became clear for the Minnesota data. See id. at 13. A similar situation was uncov-
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to merge into the male line. Both male and female jobs would 
then be scattered around the single line. Minnesota thus decided 
that pay equity did not require all jobs to be paid according to a 
single formula according to points. Defining the problem and the 
remedy by focusing on the pay trend line allows greater flexibil-
ity for the play of such factors as collective bargaining, recruit-
ment problems, or other legitimate reasons for pay discrepancy. 
The test of whether discrimination has been eliminated is that 
there no longer is a pattern of consistently lower pay for female 
jobs. The first remedy discussed, holding the employer to its 
own evaluation by requiring jobs evaluated alike to be paid 
alike, will probably be simpler to determine and administer and 
so may be more desirable for a court. Merging divergent pay 
lines into a single pay system, however, might be preferable to 
employers and unions, and would be an appropriate remedy for 
a court to approve if the parties suggest it. 
B. When There ls a Pattern of Women's and Minorities' 
Jobs Clustered Below the Pay Level for White Unskilled 
Labor 
A second pattern of wage discrimination occurs when the em-
ployer has not explicitly established the extent of the injury, but 
when there is a pattern of women's and minorities' jobs clus-
tered below the pay of entry-level, unskilled white manual labor. 
In this case, wage discrimination analysis-which indicates that 
when there is a pattern of segregated female and minority jobs 
paid less than white male jobs, particularly when most of the 
segregated jobs are at the low end of the employer's wage sched-
ule, there is reason to infer discriminatory wage practices-is a 
powerful instrument both for identifying discrimination and de-
termining the remedy. It provides a starting place for the formu-
lation of a remedy rooted in the employer's existing wage struc-
ture. The recent study in New Jersey provides a good example of 
this approach.119 
59. See generally N.J. ANALYSIS, supra note 40. The report provided the documenta-
tion for a bill requiring the adoption of a comparable worth standard of assessing state 
jobs, elimination of wage discrimination, and achievement of equitable pay patterns 
within five years. The legislature accepted the report and the bill became law, following a 
gubernatorial conditional veto and some negotiated changes. The Governor's Task Force 
on Equitable Compensation established by the Act is mandated to consider the Commis-
sion's analysis and report on its work. Act approved Oct. 17, 1984, ch. 166, 1984 N.J. 
Sess. Law Serv. 148 (West) (No. 6). 
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1. The remedy- The starting point for forging remedies in 
this kind of case is the wage rate that the employer pays for 
certain other jobs. These are jobs that are not segregated or are 
occupied by white males.60 The logical first step is to raise the 
pay of the women's and minorities' jobs to the rate of the lowest 
paid unskilled entry job held predominately by white males. Be-
cause it is the pay grade or range that is realigned, individuals 
would remain in the same relative positions within the pay · 
range. That is, if a typist had reached step 5 of the pay range 
when her classification was slotted at pay grade 04, she would 
remain at step 5 when the pay grade is raised to pay grade 06. 
The second phase is to realign all jobs related to those entry-
level positions so that the relative relationships between jobs es-
tablished by the employer are maintained, unless there has been 
proof that these internal relationships are themselves products 
of discrimination. For jobs that require previous training and 
that are not related to any of the unskilled entry-level positions, 
the entry level for broadly defined skill levels such as technical 
(to include skilled crafts and paraprofessionals) and profes-
sional/managerial might be a preferred measure for female/mi-
nority jobs in those general categories. 
2. Putting women's and minorities' jobs into their rightful 
place- The second phase of the remedy is designed to put all 
undervalued female or minority jobs into their rightful place in 
the employer's wage structure. It is appropriate because it relies 
on judgments already made by the employer about the relative 
60. Segregated jobs are generally defined as those that are 70% or more male or fe-
male, or that are disproportionately minority. See Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 
460-61. Minnesota defines male jobs as jobs that are more than 80% male, MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 43A.02(27a) (West Supp. 1987), in order to account for the greater number of 
men in state employment and in the labor force generally. MINNESOTA REPORT, supra 
note 42, at 9. "Balanced," "integrated," or "not segregated" job classes would be all 
others. In Oregon, for example, 69'Ji, of the state work force were in male-dominated 
classes, 9'Ji, in female-dominated, and 22% in mixed classes. OREGON REPORT, supra note 
57, at 8. No single statistic necessarily identifies the conditions under which prior female 
or minority job segregation should no longer give rise to an inference of wage discrimina-
tion. The test should be whether sufficient numbers of the majority have taken previ-
ously segregated jobs so that the jobs have lost their identity as female or minority so the 
inference of discrimination is no longer justified. Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 
460. Although studies indicate a direct correlation between the percent female and lower 
pay, see, e.g., COMMITTEE ON OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION AND ANALYSIS, NATIONAL RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES 28 (1981) [hereinafter NRC REPORT); Buck-
ley, Pay Differences Between Men and Women in the Same Job, MONTHLY LAB. REV., 
Nov. 1971, at 36, for the purpose of identifying the lowest pay not tainted by discrimina-
tion, either an integrated job or a predominately white male job is a satisfactory stan-
dard. Hereinafter, for convenience, both shall be referred to as white male jobs unless 
further differentiation is needed. 
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value of those jobs. Typically, the segregated jobs will have a 
wage structure of their own, distinguishable from that of 
predominantly white male jobs, but the relationship within that 
structure may be nondiscriminatory. In developing their wage 
structures, large employers, both in the public and private sec-
tors, typically utilize classification and grading to group jobs and 
to relate jobs to each other. Jobs are usually ranked in relation 
to other positions to reflect the employer's perception of differ-
ences in job level and sense of fairness. Because employees tend 
to judge the fairness of their pay by its relation to pay in other 
jobs rather than by its absolute dollar value, they also expect 
pay to reflect perceived differences in job levels. Management 
thus has interests independent of any legal requirement in en-
couraging a sense of fairness in compensation to promote a feel-
ing of employee satisfaction. 61 This is encouraged by relating 
jobs vertically, by classification or grouping of families with com-
mon elements.62 For example, a family, or group of related cleri-
cal jobs, forms a career ladder, with spaces between jobs repre-
senting differences in job level. Pay and status rise as one goes 
up the promotion ladder. Jobs may also be related horizontally. 
One reason for relating jobs horizontally is the desire to group 
dissimilar jobs into relatively few pay grades. Employers' inter-
ests in promoting employee satisfaction is served, and a feeling 
61. J. HICKS, THE THEORY OF WAGES 317 (2d ed. 1963). Professor Hicks states: 
(T]he labour market is-by nature, and quite independently of Trade Union or-
ganisation-a very special kind of a market, a market which is likely to develop 
"social" as well as purely economic aspects ... , For the purely economic corre-
spondence between the wage paid to a particular worker and his value to the 
employer is not a sufficient condition of efficiency; it is also necessary that there 
should not be strong feelings of injustice about the relative treatment of differ-
ent employees (since these would diminish the efficiency of the team) .... 
[W)age rates are more uniform, both between workers, and over time, than they 
would be if the labour market worked like a commodity market. 
Id., quoted in Dunlop, Industrial Relations and Economics: The Common Frontier of 
Wage Determination, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING 11 
(B. Dennis ed. 1984) (Industrial Relations Research Ass'n Series) (distinguished speaker 
address), reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D-1 (Jan. 3, 1985). 
62. Jobs with similar duties and knowledge base, but which require different levels of 
knowledge or which have different responsibilities, are grouped into "job families," also 
called "series" or "lines of progression." For example, mechanic jobs make up one series, 
while clerical jobs form another. Jobs in a family or a series are ranked in relation to 
other positions in the series to meet a "felt fairness" test. For example, distinguishing 
between job levels, even in highly "objective, scientific" evaluation systems, is done pri-
marily intuitively, relying on the ability to perceive differences. Job evaluation systems 
generally incorporate a scale based on empirical studies that have quantified the amount 
of difference necessary to detect a difference in levels between similar jobs. The more 
nearly alike the work of two jobs, the greater is the likelihood that employees in one of 
the jobs will measure the fairness of their pay by comparison with the other. 
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of fairness is encouraged, by rationalizing the compensation sys-
tem-particularly by equalizing pay for jobs requiring similar 
knowledge and responsibility, but dissimilar duties and tasks.63 
Jobs are also almost inevitably related through the operation 
of the kinds of job evaluation systems used by most large em-
ployers. Although it is theoretically possible to factor, evaluate, 
and rank every job, this is rarely done. Rather, a full scale in-
quiry is made for only a relatively few "benchmark" or "key" 
jobs, and the other jobs are ranked in relation to the bench-
mark.6" The benchmark jobs form a structure, and the other jobs 
are evaluated and slotted into that structure. Pay for other jobs 
is derived by keying or indexing related jobs to the benchmark 
job. Thus, in general, rankings and positions vis-a-vis bench-
mark jobs can be understood to be the employer's estimate of 
the relationship to one another that the jobs should occupy. 
Problems arise, however, when the benchmark or key jobs are 
not representative of all job families.66 This is one way in which 
dissimilar jobs can be grouped together for a more invidious pur-
pose, such as to obviate unwanted comparisons.66 Because many 
63. Unions, too, have such an interest and often press for such implementation of 
"equal pay," even when resisting management proposals for formal job evaluation. The 
prime function of job evaluation is comparing dissimilar jobs so that jobs that have dif-
ferent content but that are similar with respect to skill, effort, responsibility, and work-
ing conditions can be slotted into the same pay grade. Paying like wage rates for jobs of 
the same grade is what is traditionally meant by equal pay for equal work. See Wage 
Discrimination, supra note 1, at 428-45 (extensively discussing job evaluation systems). 
This differs substantially from the legal definition of equal work under the Equal Pay 
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(l) (1982) (defining "equal work" to require jobs that are similar, 
including similar job content, or jobs that "look alike," Angelo v. Bacharach Instrument 
Co., 555 F.2d 1164, 1171-73 (3d Cir. 1977)). 
64. Jobs are generally grouped by classification and job family with "benchmark" or 
"key" jobs representing each grouping. The benchmark jobs are usually selected by the 
evaluation committee on the basis of agreement among committee members as to rank-
ing and point worth. Benchmark or key jobs must be susceptible of exact and well-un-
derstood definitions, and agreement on the existing rate for the job. See Wage Discrimi-
nation, supra note 1, at 433, 434 n.143; see also id. at 439-40 (discussing ways a 
benchmark system can discriminate). 
65. The same effect can be achieved by constructing job families of dissimilar jobs 
that share, as the common element, the race or sex of the usual occupants. 
66. Fairness tends to be in the eye of the beholder. Not only are employees more 
likely to compare their jobs with others that are similar in nature and that are done 
nearby, but, until recently, dichotomies based on traditional separation of the sexes (and 
races) were taken for granted, and employees tended to compare their jobs with those 
done by others of the same sex or race, rather than comparing across sex or race lines. 
See Newman, The Policy Issues: Presentation III, 1 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc. 
265, 271 (1976). Newman notes that when the International Union of Electric Workers 
negotiated pay equity increases for undervalued women's jobs, it was other women who 
complained about the change. They had been accustomed to the female wage structure 
and thought those relationships fair; they did not even consider comparing their jobs or 
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occupational categories are sex- or race-identified and segre-
gated, avoiding direct comparison of relative job worth across 
occupational categories has been relatively easy. Some of the 
mechanisms for accomplishing this have included using separate 
evaluation plans, using different factors, weighting factors differ-
ently, or having multiple wage schedules in which jobs are inter-
nally related only to key jobs that can be said to fall within the 
same labor market. Thus, nurses, dieticians, and librarians may 
be on one schedule, trade and maintenance workers on another, 
and managers on a third.87 The "key" job or "benchmark" job 
system that pegs the evaluation of the key job to the market rate 
for that job is probably the most common method used. Any his-
pay with the male jobs, so they had not been disturbed about the real undervaluation of 
some of the female jobs. Id. at 269-71. 
67. Except for broad categories such as manager, which require applicants who share 
a "common body of knowledge," the "labor markets" recognized in such job evaluation 
plans rarely refer to a pool of people with similar training or skills from which employers 
usually recruit, although that is what the term is generally thought to mean. Rather, they 
tend to include a varied collection of different occupations and skills that are similar 
primarily in who does the work. Dunlop suggests that in large enterprises job competi-
tion is still limited for practical purposes to a certain range of occupations "within pro-
duction and maintenance, technical and professional, clerical and top management cate-
gories" which are "practically isolated from each other." Dunlop, supra note 61, at 10, 
reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at D-1 (citing J. CAIRNES, SOME LEADING PRINCIPLES 
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, NEWLY EXPOUNDED 72 (1874) on noncompeting groups); see also 
Bergmann, The Effect on White Incomes of Discrimination in Employment, 79 J. PoL. 
EcoN. 294 (1971) (Professor Bergmann is the leading exponent of the "crowding theory," 
applying the theory of noncompeting groups to modern sex and race segregation.); Wage 
Discrimination, supra note 1, at 451-54. The usual evaluation plan based on labor mar-
kets, however, is restricted even more drastically than those Dunlop recognizes. For in-
stance, female technical and professional, and possibly clerical, will be considered one 
labor market; male technical and professional another. See supra note 57. If the rates for 
these job groupings define labor markets for purposes of developing evaluation plans, the 
circle is complete. The approach taken by the Supreme Court in City of Los Angeles 
Department of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (reviewing city's pension 
plan scheme that required women employees to make higher mandatory contributions 
than men), should be followed in determining whether such plans are legitimate under 
either Title VII or the Equal Pay Act. 
Manhart, a Title VII case involving different men's and women's jobs, thus, arguably, 
would not have been covered by the Equal Pay Act. The city, however, relied on the 
fourth affirmative defense of the Act to claim that rates based on actuarial tables were 
legal because they were a "factor other than sex." Id. at 706-07. The Court held that 
rates based on actuarial tables were not factors other than sex, because "one cannot 'say 
that an actuarial distinction based entirely on sex is "based on any other factor other 
than sex." Sex is exactly what it is based on.'" Id. at 712-13 (quoting the appellate 
court's decision, Manhart v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 553 F.2d 581, 
588 (1976)) (footnote omitted). The question "How can a factor that is based on sex be a 
factor other than sex?" should also be asked about labor market demarcations based on 
sex, and the answer should be the same. 
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torical or community bias is thus imported into the wage 
structure. 68 
It is particularly likely that female and minority jobs will be 
keyed to a relatively few samples of dissimilar female and mi-
nority jobs. Thus, not only will the ranking for "head nurse," a 
managerial position, probably be keyed to "registered nurse" in-
stead of to other (male) managerial positions, but functionally 
unrelated female jobs may also be keyed to the same female 
benchmark. For example, librarian and dietician may be indexed 
or keyed to "nurse," or all three to "secretary."69 If a women's 
job is keyed to other women's jobs, any undervaluation of the 
key job will be transmitted to all jobs keyed to it. The conse-
quence is a dual wage structure, such as was found in 
Minnesota. 70 
Even where the segregated jobs have their own wage structure, 
however, that structure often reflects the employer's nondiscrim-
inatory sense of how the jobs within that structure should be 
related to each other. Within a given group, for example, the 
relationships between jobs are typically established as a function 
of a certain number of points. Within this point system, the 
women's and minorities' jobs group may have been slotted lower 
on the pay scale than the white men's jobs group, but with simi-
lar point spread between each of the women's and minorities' 
jobs as between the male jobs. Once the nondiscriminatory en-
try-level rate has been established, rates for the higher rated 
women's jobs may be calculated by reference to the point spread 
between each of the women's jobs. 
To remedy underpayment, the presumptively nondiscrimina-
tory structure established by the employer for the women's or 
minorities' jobs remains intact. It is simply realigned with the 
male wage structure, which was also set by the employer. Thus, 
by first raising the entry-level pay for unskilled female and mi-
nority jobs to the same grade as the lowest paid entry-level un-
skilled white male job, then realigning all jobs related to those 
entry-level positions to maintain the relative relationships set by 
the employer, the basic nondiscriminatory business judgments 
made by the employer are preserved. The employer's own value 
system has determined the extent of the undervaluation. The 
68. See generally Wage Discrimination, supra note 1. 
69. See id. at 439; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL/NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, JOB 
EVALUATION: AN ANALYTIC REVIEW 35, 53 (1979) (Interim Report to the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission). 
70. See supra text accompanying notes 48-58. 
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employer thus has "quantif[ied] the effect of sex discrimination 
on the wage rates. "71 
3. The New Jersey study- Initially, the New Jersey Com-
mission on Sex Discrimination in the Statutes72 approached the 
problem of identifying whether there was discrimination by at-
tempting to compare predominately women's jobs with predomi-
nately men's jobs. Relatively few classifications were more than 
seventy percent female, and the job-for-job comparison was not 
helpful. The approach was then changed from a "comparable 
worth" analysis to simply a search for wage discrimination fol-
lowing the theory developed in Wage Discrimination, Job Seg-
regation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.73 Exami-
nation of the employment data for both women and minorities 
indicated that minorities-both men and women-had begun to 
move into some of the positions once occupied solely by white 
women. Moreover, although there had been some movement of 
women and minorities into formerly white male bastions, most 
women and minorities continued to work in stereotypical 
"women's" and "minorities' "jobs, in relatively few state govern-
mental departments. They were clustered in only a few posi-
tions, but those positions were almost entirely female or minor-
ity or both. 74 Moreover, women and minorities earned less than 
71. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 181 (1981). · 
72. In February 1982, the New Jersey State Division on Women of the Department of 
Community Affairs created a Task Force on Employment, which formed the Subcommit-
tee on Comparable Worth Legislation. The Commission on Sex Discrimination in the 
Statutes, a bipartisan commission created by law in 1978 and a Task Force participant, 
performed the study and reported its conclusions in N.J. ANALYSIS, supra note 40. (At the 
request of the Commission, I assisted in the preparation of the analysis and report.) The 
legislature accepted the report and, with some modifications requested by the Governor, 
passed the bill, which referred to the report in adopting a policy that state compensation 
should reflect the job, not the sex of the people doing the job. It established a Task Force 
on Equitable Compensation authorized to eliminate wage discrimination and achieve eq-
uitable compensation in five years. The work of the Task Force will be done in phases 
over about eighteen months. The first recommendations issued at six months recom-
mended that the pay for the lowest tier jobs be raised. See Act approved Jan. 8, 1986, ch. 
402, 1985 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 177 (West) (No. 11) (committee statement) (appropriating 
funds to implement this recommendation); see also infra text accompanying note 100 
(discussing the second alternative remedy). 
73. Wage Discrimination, supra note 1. 
74. In New Jersey, some positions in new technologies tend to be integrated, and 
some of the positions are beginning to lose their previously sex-segregated character. The 
Commission found, however, that some positions that had traditionally been predomi-
nately white female were being "integrated" only in the sense that minority men and 
women were now included. Thus, in some of those positions, the percentage of females 
had declined to about 68'';., but the combination of women and minorities totaled over 
39r;,. The Commission determined that the same kind of attitudes identified and down-
graded positions associated with either race or sex. See generally N.J. ANALYSIS, supra 
note 40, at 12. 
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white men. 76 Indeed, not only were they clustered in few jobs, 
but those jobs occupied the bottom of the pay scale. 76 
As the Commission looked at the work force demo-
graphics-particularly at what level women and minorities were 
working, at what level white men started, and at the qualifica-
tions and pay for entry-level jobs-and compared a sample of 
jobs at various skill and supervisory levels that had similar expe-
rience and educational requirements, it became obvious that old 
patterns persisted. There remained clearly defined women's jobs, 
minorities' jobs, a few integrated jobs, and finally, white men's 
jobs. The expected pay patterns likewise persisted. After investi-
gation, the Commission concluded that "discriminatory job pat-
terns perpetuate traditional negative attitudes toward minorities 
and women and are translated into depressed wages paid to 
those jobs. This constitutes a wage discrimination which must be 
ended."77 While recognizing that access for women and minori-
ties to nontraditional jobs is essential and that affirmative action 
to end sex-segregated jobs is a necessity, the Commission re-
ported that opening access would not be sufficient: "Even if 
75. Id. at 14. 
76. Id. at 16-18. 
77. Id. at ii (Summary of Findings and Recommendations). The report also identified 
at least 15 specific practices that led to lower pay for women's and minorities' jobs. Some 
of the problems identified in New Jersey are the same as those identified in other states. 
See, e.g., OREGON REPORT, supra note 57, at 7. The New Jersey findings are discussed in 
Wage Discrimination Revisited, supra note 10, at 130. One of the major problems identi-
fied inheres in the job evaluation system chosen. For all practical purposes, the evalua-
tion system used in New Jersey provides no guidelines for distinguishing between rela-
tively unskilled jobs up through the first line supervisory level. Too many skill levels are 
included, and specification of factors is too vague to inform evaluators how to rate these 
jobs. Thus, judgments as to these lowest level jobs are almost purely subjective, allowing 
stereotyped notions free play. This problem is exacerbated by position descriptions for 
women's jobs that are written in broad, overly vague language, while men's descriptions 
are clearer, more forceful, more likely to use the language of the evaluation system, and 
therefore make the men's jobs seem more demanding when, in reality, approximately the 
same level of skills is required. Some classifications are so broad they contain jobs re-
quiring different levels of skill and responsibility; these are usually women's and minori-
ties' jobs that are often evaluated at the level of the lower skills, while the few broad 
male classes are often evaluated and paid at the level of the highest skill. Moreover, 
women's classes are more likely to be large, with many occupants. Men's classes tend to 
be small. This translates into an inability to distinguish and compensate for differences 
in women's and minorities' jobs to the same extent that male jobs are distinguished and 
compensated. Furthermore, it is less costly-and therefore more likely-to give a small 
number of people raises than it is to raise the pay for job classes with several thousand 
workers. One fairly simple step some employers can take to integrate their pay systems is 
to divide some of the overly broad clerical jobs to better distinguish skills and levels, and 
then slot those requiring higher level skills throughout more of the pay scale. This alone, 
in some establishments, would break up the pattern of women's jobs being clustered at 
the bottom of the pay scale. Several other structural problems with the system also tend 
to downgrade women's jobs, including those at the managerial and professional levels. 
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more female or minority workers move into occupations previ-
ously dominated by males, if white men are not also attracted to 
traditional women's [and minorities'] jobs, the undervalued tra-
ditionally female [and minority] jobs will still be undervalued 
and still be segregated. "78 The Commission recommended that 
the State should strive to create a logical "unisex" pay 
structure, that is, a rate which within existing social pat-
terns and wage rates attracts both men and women to a 
job. Only in this way will jobs become desegregated. This 
is also the best test of whether the pay structure is non-
discriminatory. 79 
a. Developing a unisex wage based on the employer's own 
standards- Development of a unisex wage is within the capac-
ity of courts and employers. Again, the New Jersey experience is 
instructive. First, New Jersey, like most other large employers, 
had already adopted a job evaluation system. That means that 
the employer had adopted and implemented a value system that 
determined pay for the State's employees. New Jersey had de-
cided that the criteria of job worth for pay purposes would be 
"know-how," "problem solving," and "accountability."80 Second, 
the State had decided what experience and education a particu-
lar job requires. The requirements described in a position (job) 
description indicate what the position requires at entry level. 
The New Jersey evaluation system, like most systems, measures 
78. N.J. ANALYSIS, supra note 40, at 3. 
79. Id. 
BO. Id. at 5. In 1968, New Jersey adopted-and continues to use-the Hay 
Guidechart system of job evaluation. Id. New Jersey, however, had decided to use only 
three factors, though many employers who use the Hay system also add a fourth factor, 
"working conditions," when evaluating both white and blue collar jobs. Both "know-
how" and "problem solving" are measures of skills, experience, and education. Know-
how measures how much of these factors are required to do a job, while problem solving 
measures what percentage of the available know-how is generally used in doing this job. 
Thus, education and skill levels are crucial elements in computing the relative value of 
jobs to the employer. 
Inclusion of "working conditions" tends to downgrade office work as opposed to most 
male blue collar jobs. Critics, therefore, generally claim that the usual way of using 
"working conditions" is discriminatory to women. It was probably for this reason that 
New Jersey eliminated this factor. The Hay system, like most others using "working 
conditions," awards no points to typical office work because the office is defined as the 
standard of good working conditions. The claim of discrimination is not only that most 
women work in offices, but that the evaluation systems, in defining unpleasant working 
conditions that deserve additional pay points, have rated office work incorrectly and 
have not credited many aspects that make office work hazardous to a worker's health. 
See generally J. STELLMAN & M. HENIFIN, OFFICE WORK CAN BE DANGEROUS TO YouR 
HEALTH (1983). 
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only the job to be performed as described in the job description. 
It does not measure the skills or other qualifications individual 
occupants of the position may possess.81 The Commission de-
cided that an employer should be held to the standards it says it 
uses when evaluating women's or minorities' job classifications. 
It found that New Jersey had not used its standards in the same 
way for jobs held predominately by women and minorities as for 
white men's jobs.82 
b. Pay patterns in New Jersey- The pay patterns in New 
Jersey are much like those of other large employers. Women's 
and minorities' positions are clustered at the bottom of the pay 
schedule, between pay ranges 03 and 07.83 Most white male un-
skilled entry-level jobs start at pay range 09.84 
i. Women and minorities are clustered at the bottom of the 
pay scale- Over 6000 women-about ten percent of the state 
employees-are in the ranges at the bottom of the State's pay 
scale.85 These ranges include not only entry-level positions for 
traditional women's and minorities' work, but also several ad-
vanced levels of clerical positions. 86 The lowest paid white male 
unskilled common laboring job with more than fifteen occu-
81. See generally N.J. ANALYSIS, supra note 40. 
82. Id. at 7-11, 16-24. . 
83. Id. at 16. The New Jersey compensation plan is divided into 45 pay ranges, each 
with eight steps. A formula translated individual job ratings into evaluation and pay 
ranges. Although technically the compensation schedule begins with pay ranges 01, there 
are few occupied jobs below pay range 03. The lowest position with more than 15 em-
ployees is at pay range 03. Id. 
The following comparison of the pay and evaluation points for New Jersey state posi-
tions is complicated by the fact that New Jersey is unique among the states in maintain-
ing dual workweeks. Office workers (predominately female) generally work 35 hours per 
week and are paid at one range below their evaluated range. Id. at 5 n.1. Blue collar 
workers (predominately male, but including many female and minority jobs in institu-
tions) generally work a 40-hour week and are paid one range above their actual evaluated 
range. Id. The step up or down is justified in order to accommodate two work weeks in 
one pay schedule. Id. In the following discussion, I have adjusted the figures for time 
worked, so data on jobs and pay are comparable. Although this system results in many 
women earning less per week than men in lower rated jobs, there was no evidence that 
the system was intended to harm women. Moreover, the Commission decided that in the 
trade-off between more pay and longer hours versus less pay and shorter hours, it is 
unclear where the advantage lies, and recommended that it be left to the collective bar-
gaining process. Id. On the other hand, if it were proven that the 40-hour week was a 
pretense to enable higher pay for those jobs, such a system would be discriminatory. For 
example, if the 40-hour week included paid lunch time, and lunch time was not included 
in the 35-hour week, both should receive paid lunch time to remedy the discrimination in 
compensation. 
84. Id. at 18. 
85. Id. at 16. 
86. Id. 
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pants-the position of "helper"-is paid at grade 06,87 even 
though it requires no higher level of education, skill, or effort 
than the largest female/minority unskilled labor job, "building 
maintenance worker," which is paid at range 04.88 The Commis-
sion realized that only the minority laboring positions were 
rated less than the clerical jobs. All white male laboring jobs, 
which require no more education or experience than those mi-
nority jobs, are paid higher rates than even advanced women's 
jobs. There is thus a consistent pattern of female and minority 
jobs clustered well below white male jobs requiring no more 
"know-how," "problem solving," or "accountability." Moreover, 
the proportion of white men increases dramatically in the better 
paid levels of the series. 89 
Range 07 is the largest of the first ten pay ranges. It is over-
whelmingly female and minority. There are 4815 employees in 
range 07: 3072 women (64%) and 1743 men (36%). Fewer than 
800 of these employees are white men. Most of these white men, 
approximately 625 of them, work in four job titles that are pre-
dominately female or minority. Only one range 07 job is even 
two-thirds white male.90 In range 08 there is one predominately 
(77 % ) white male job, and the position description states that it 
is an "entry level position and therefore no formal education or 
experience is required."91 
87. Id. 
88. Id. This entry-level building maintenance worker classification is 83.6% female or 
minority. One of the reasons the first approach tried by the Commission-comparing 
only jobs 70'',, or more male and female-gave few indications of discriminatory patterns 
is that this job, which is close to 67':i, female, was not included as female. Nor did that 
approach take account of the fact that this laboring job is definitely minority. It is evalu-
ated slightly lower than the lowest clerical job, which is predominately female. But be-
cause it is a 40-hour/week job while the clerical jobs are 35, they are paid the same. 
Therefore, the pay schedule looked more integrated than when the minority status of 
this position was taken into account. 
89. The next level, senior building maintenance worker (pay range 07), is 30% white 
male. Id. at 17. In the supervisory level position "foreman building maintenance," 70% 
of the workers are men, id., although almost 70'Ji, of those supervised are female. This is 
a fairly common pattern: going up the job ladder, as the pay increases, the number and 
proportion of white males in female or minority areas also increases. This is particularly 
marked at the supervisory and managerial levels. Other well-documented examples are 
that elementary and high school teachers tend to be women (although the number of 
men increases at the high school level), while most principals tend to be men; librarians 
in small libraries and at the lower levels of large ones tend to be women, while top libra-
rian jobs are usually held by men; and predominately female work forces in many highly 
feminized industries such as insurance, banking, and the garment industry are often 
bossed by men. See Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 406 n.30. 
90. N.J. ANALYSIS, supra note 40, at 17. This is the Department of Transportation 
position "maintenance worker," which is approximately two-thirds white male. The rest 
are minority males. 
91. Id. 
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ii. Where most white men start- It is not until pay range 
09 that there are a significant number of titles in which white 
men predominate. In fact, although there are far more women 
than men paid in this range-most in senior level clerical posi-
tions that require independent judgment, organizational skills, 
and "considerable knowledge of department laws, regulations, 
policies and procedures"-there are more men's jobs in this 
range than women's.92 Of twenty-six positions surveyed, thirteen 
are more than 70 % male, while only nine positions are female 
dominated. 93 The majority of these white male positions require 
neither experience nor prior training. Those few that call for 
prior entry qualifications require only six months of common la-
boring experience, and no additional education. Of the thirteen 
different job titles, about half are remarkably similar in tasks 
performed and abilities required. They all involve basic un-
skilled entry-level janitorial work.04 Moreover, the Commission 
noted that some male entry-level positions (at range 07) were 
evidently being used only for temporary training, while the level 
09 position seemed to be the "real" job. The entry-level title re-
quires no education or experience; the next higher level merely 
requires six months of common labor experience. The Commis-
sion suspected that white men were either rapidly promoted into 
the higher level job or were more likely to be hired directly onto 
that level than minority men. Unlike most lines of progression, 
which are pyramidal, there are relatively few workers in the po-
sitions in the lower range 07 position. Most workers occupy 
range 09. Moreover, there is a higher number and proportion of 
white men at the higher level.9~ 
Thus, New Jersey, like most large employers, has several en-
try-level jobs-such as common laborer-that do not require 
any previous education, skill, or training and that call for mini-
mal discretion. The employer has committed itself to pay all 
jobs according to the quantum and level of these criteria the job 
92. Id. at 18 (quoting position description). This is also the lowest pay range in which 
there are any integrated jobs with more than 15 employees. See supra note 83. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 19. The Commission recommended that the State Civil Service Commission 
(CSC) investigate whether or not the practices of hiring at a higher level or of rapid 
promotion operate in a discriminatory manner. Note also that the CSC had recently 
reevaluated two corrections officer positions. Finding them similar, the CSC merged the 
lower position with the higher, so that all corrections officers are now paid the same. 
Based on this action by the CSC, the Commission suggested that for these jobs also it 
might be appropriate to merge the lower, more heavily minority job with the next higher 
level title. Id. The resulting job title would retain the lower entry requirements, but 
would be paid at the higher rate. Id. 
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requires. Therefore, according to the employer's own system and 
commitment, all these unskilled entry-level positions should oc-
cupy the same pay range. 
c. Realignment when there are several different white un-
skilled entry pay levels- The remaining question, then, is 
which is the most appropriate entry-level pay grade when there 
are several white male unskilled entry-level jobs at different pay 
levels. Optimally, the parties might negotiate a beginning wage 
for all unskilled entry-level jobs. Either the court or the parties 
could reasonably choose from at least three possible solutions: 
i. Alternative 1: The lowest white male job- Under this al-
ternative, both the white male and the female/minority wage 
structures remain intact except that the entry-level women's and 
minorities' jobs are shifted up to the pay grade now occupied by 
the lowest white male job. 
In New Jersey, this would mean that the lowest entry-level 
pay would be in range 06. The building maintenance, food ser-
vice, and laundry workers-who are primarily women or minori-
ties, and are usually both-and the entry-level clericals-
predominantly women and including many minorities-would 
rise from pay level 04 to pay level 06. Other jobs related to these 
entry-level positions would likewise be adjusted to maintain the 
previous relationships within the job families or job ladders. In 
this example, "senior clerks" paid at range 07-three ranges 
higher than the beginning entry-level clerical jobs-would re-
main three ranges higher and be paid at range 09. The "princi-
pal clerk"96 and the "head clerk"97 positions would be raised to 
pay ranges 14 and 16, respectively. This would put the principal 
clerk within one evaluation range of other (male) supervisory po-
sitions that also require two years' experience and involve simi-
lar duties. 98 
Although this proposal might not satisfy all advocates of pay 
reform, it is a defensible solution based on the standards and 
relationships determined by the employer. It is thus a minimal 
remedy,99 which occasions relatively slight interference with 
managerial decisionmaking, while, nevertheless, providing a 
remedy for the worst of the pay discrimination. The very mini-
mal nature of such an order might spur employers and unions to 
96. This position, which involves actually performing the tasks as well as supervising, 
and which requires two years of experience, is now paid at range 12. 
97. This position requires three years of experience-one as supervisor-and is now 
paid at range 14. 
98. N.J. ANALYSIS, supra note 40, at 21-22. 
99. Like the "black only" remedies in the steel industry, see supra note 39. 
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go further in revising the pay system. They might, for instance, 
voluntarily undertake a reevaluation and revision of job descrip-
tions and of the classification, evaluation, or compensation sys-
tems. This might be a real possibility if the court order created 
tensions between women and minorities who receive pay raises, 
and men who do not. The men may press for such revisions to 
correct possible perceived inequities in their jobs or pay. 
ii. Alternative 2: The highest white male unskilled laboring 
jobs- Because the employer has adopted standards for evaluat-
ing jobs and has indicated that the several white male entry-
level positions require similar qualifications and have similar 
tasks, but pays them differently, it might be politic to choose the 
highest of the white male laboring jobs without prior qualifica-
tions as the beginning rate. Thus, all job classes below would be 
merged into this highest unskilled laboring pay grade. In the 
New Jersey example, for instance, all the bottom jobs, including 
any white male jobs paid at a lower grade, would move up to 
range 09. Again, obviously, if women's or minorities' jobs require 
higher qualifications but are paid less than the new entry level, 
appropriate proportionate adjustments should be made: the 
other jobs related to those entry jobs should also be adjusted to 
maintain the employer's female or minority wage structure. This 
is a remedy a court would be less likely to choose than might the 
parties through negotiation or collective bargaining. It is similar 
to the first step proposed by Senator Lipman of New Jersey, op-
posing the initial step recommended by the Governor's Task 
Force on Equitable Compensation.100 
Senator Lipman recommended that all bottom jobs be raised 
to the poverty level, which in New Jersey is approximately 
$12,500 for a family of four. This would put the starting salary 
for New Jersey jobs at the equivalent of the present 08 pay level. 
Senator Lipman's proposal was grounded in the proposition that 
no one in New Jersey state service should be paid less than pov-
erty level for working. Other employers might well believe that 
better employee morale and productivity might result from rais-
ing pay not only for the low-paying women's and minorities' 
jobs, but also for the lowest paid men's jobs, particularly if pub-
licity or union bargaining pressure has highlighted that some 
men's jobs are paid less than others with no more requirements. 
Senator Lipman's first phase proposal, however, stopped short 
of putting all women's and minorities' jobs into their rightful 
100. See Alternative 3, the Task Force proposal, infra. 
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place in the wage hierarchy. 101 She did not adjust the rates for 
those higher level jobs that had been paid less than the new pro-
posed bottom rate. Under her proposal, those jobs would thus 
receive only the same pay as jobs with few requirements. In ad-
dition, her proposal did not increase the rates of jobs that al-
ready had starting salaries above the "poverty level." As a re-
sult, the rates for those jobs would no longer have reflected the 
differences in skill levels that the employer had previously rec-
ognized. These jobs would continue to be underpaid not only as 
compared to male-dominated jobs, but now also as compared to 
lower women's and minorities' jobs. These steps are necessary to 
avoid a wage compression that would almost ensure employee 
dissatisfaction, and to maintain the supposedly nondiscrimina-
tory relationships set by the employer. 
m. Alternative 3: The Task Force proposal- The recom-
mendation of the Governor's Task Force on Equitable Compen-
sation, as a first step, also took the approach of raising the pay 
of women's and minorities' jobs clustered at the bottom of the 
pay schedule. The Task Force chose a different formula, how-
ever. It recommended that all positions paid below pay range 06 
be raised to 06. 102 Positions slotted into pay ranges 06 to 08 
would receive a five percent or one pay range raise so that all 
jobs previously rated 06 would be paid at 07, and so on. This, 
the Task Force said, would provide pay raises for about eighty 
percent of the women and minorities working for the State. 
While this proposal, as far as it goes, resembles the first alterna-
tive, 103 it has a major flaw. It maintains the old relationships be-
tween women's/minorities' jobs and the men's jobs. Because the 
evaluation of the job, the attendant status, and pay are relative, 
maintaining the old relationships simply continues the prior dis-
crimination at a higher level. 10• 
101. Senator Lipman's proposal deliberately dealt only with raising salaries to pov-
erty level, because she anticipated that a revised job evaluation system would later do 
equity. Conversation with Senator Lipman (Dec. 1985); see infra note 104. 
102. This was the pay for the lowest male job and to this point resembles Alterna-
tive 1. 
103. See Alternative 1, supra. 
104. Neither the Task Force nor Senator Lipman's recommendations reached all the 
jobs related to entry-level jobs that they proposed to raise. The reason for this was that 
they interpreted their mandate both as eliminating discrimination and affirmatively 
changing or improving the evaluation system. To this end they have hired a consultant 
who is to assist them in evaluating the system and in recommending changes. All mem-
bers of the Task Force expect the consultant to recommend new evaluations for many of 
the women's and minorities' jobs. It is expected that some positions may be raised more 
by a new evaluation system than by simply realigning all jobs according to the adjusted 
beginning rate for all entry-level jobs. Conversations with Barbara Fields, Executive Di-
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4. Applying the remedy when the employer has not evalu-
ated jobs- In New Jersey and wherever the employer has 
adopted a value system by which to rate jobs, but has then devi-
ated from its professed standards by paying segregated jobs less 
than white male jobs with no higher qualifications, it is reasona-
ble to hold the employer to its own standards in fashioning a 
remedy. Thus, ratings are adjusted so that all entry-level jobs 
with no fewer requirements than the lowest paid white male job 
are paid what that job is paid. This approach to determining a 
remedy is also applicable when the employer has not formally 
adopted such a value system. Because at the time of their hiring 
all entry-level employees possess similar kinds and amounts of 
skill, with any necessary learning to be acquired on the job, 
there is a presumption that when factors of sex or race are disre-
garded the employer values one employee about as much as an-
other. The pay for the unskilled, white male jobs is presumably 
either the lowest pay that an employer would pay white men, or 
the lowest wage for which white men would work. Women and 
minorities should not be paid less because of their sex or race. 
Therefore, their wages should be equalized to the white men's 
entry-level pay even though the jobs have a different content.106 
5. Clerical starting salaries should be aligned with other un-
skilled work- The statement that all entry-level employees pos-
sess similar quantities and qualities of skill, with any learning to 
be acquired on the job, is generally true for blue collar work but 
not for clerical work. The majority of female-dominated jobs re-
quire some type of "learned" ability prior to hiring, such as typ-
ing or clerical skills. Clerical jobs also assume a higher degree of 
schooling than most common labor jobs.106 It is fair to assume, 
rector, Governor's Task Force on Equitable Compensation (June 1985), and with Senator 
Lipman (Dec. 1985). 
105. See Bergmann & Gray, Economic Models as a Means of Calculating Legal 
Compensation Claims, 8 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 59 (1984) (neoclassical economist's labor 
market analysis demonstrating that all unskilled entry-level jobs would be paid the 
same, but for sex or race discrimination). I disagree on the second stage of developing a 
remedy. Bergmann and Gray would require employers to adopt job evaluation systems to 
determine unbiased pay for women's jobs. After developing entirely new classification, 
evaluation, and compensation systems, the Oregon Task Force recommended that most 
of the equitable raises go to the women's jobs that had been clustered at the bottom of 
the old pay scale. OREGON REPORT, supra note 57, sec. V. The remedies suggested here 
achieve much the same result without problems of new job evaluations, etc. 
106. Proponents of the notion of human capital oppose the idea that low pay is a 
discriminatory consequence of segregation by claiming that women are paid less because, 
expecting to leave the labor market for marriage and childbearing, they do not build 
human capital by investing in education and training. Yet it is precisely "women's jobs" 
that require the employee to invest in training costs prior to employment that pay the 
least. For men's jobs there is generally on-the-job training, on the payroll. 
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therefore, that work requiring higher levels of skill and training 
would be paid at least as much as the least demanding job in the 
business. 
Some proponents of pay equity might argue that the higher 
requirements of clerical work mandate even better pay than for 
unskilled male laboring jobs. Many employers agree, and accord-
ingly pay beginning clericals more than some laboring jobs. 
Note, however, that those laboring jobs are usually performed by 
minorities. 107 On the other hand, one of the difficulties in devis-
ing a remedy for pay discrimination is comparing jobs across 
content lines. This problem is particularly acute when compar-
ing clerical jobs and blue collar jobs. Yet each tends to have its 
own wage structure, and within the clerical job family some jobs 
are recognized as less skilled than others. These are generally 
the basic entry-level clerical jobs; these should be analogized to 
the least skilled entry-level blue collar jobs for purposes of esti-
mating the extent of underpayment due to sex discrimination. 
Because each segment of the salary scale has a bottom-the 
starting pay for the lowest ranked job in that line-aligning the 
bottom for each segment recognizes the employer's business 
judgment in deciding at what competitive level its pay schedule 
should be, while simultaneously wringing out of the salary scale 
the considerations of sex or race that have depressed the pay for 
female and minority jobs. 
Thus, the employer's starting rate for white male common la-
bor becomes the starting place for the rest of the employer's 
wages. By then adjusting the related jobs to maintain the em-
ployer-determined internal relationships among positions, a non-
discriminatqry pay realignment can be ordered based on the em-
ployer's own wage structure. A court ordering such a remedy, 
therefore, does not substitute its own subjective judgment for 
the employer's as to the general relative value of jobs. The rem-
edy is firmly rooted in the employer's own value judgments and 
practices. 
This standard is less firm than when the employer has explic-
itly established the effect of sex or race discrimination on the 
pay rates. Experience, however, indicates that the realignment 
that occurs will probably put most of the women's and minori-
ties' jobs in the same pay bracket as functionally similar posi-
107. See supra note 88. In New Jersey, the entry clerical job is actually evaluated 
higher, but is paid the same as the minority maintenance job because of the dual (35/40 
hour) work week/dual salary structure described supra note 83. 
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tions, or close to it. 1O8 To the extent that there may be some 
uncertainty in exactly how much women's and minorities' jobs 
have been depressed, this uncertainty can be shared between the 
parties. Thus, it should not be necessary to determine exactly 
where particular jobs should be slotted. The approximation sug-
gested here meets the requirements of the remedial principle 
most often invoked by uncertainty in Title VII cases. 1O0 That is, 
once liability has been established there should be a remedy. 
Damages should be assessed on the most reasonable basis availa-
ble, but uncertainty as to the amount of damages should not re-
lieve the wrongdoer of responsibility. The primary risk of error 
arising from uncertainty should rest on the wrongdoer. 
The countervailing principle is that unless a plaintiff can es-
tablish the amount of damages with sufficient certainty, the 
court will not entertain the cause of action because there is an 
insufficient basis to justify a recovery. This is the principle gen-
erally applied to claims of breach of contract, uo not to claims 
arising in tort for injury to dignitary or economic interests, nor 
to claims of a federal right arising under a broad remedial stat-
ute. Some opponents of pay equity go even further, arguing that 
still higher standards of certainty be required of plaintiffs in 
wage discrimination suits. m Such standards would require 
plaintiffs to demonstrate the effect of sex discrimination on the 
pay rate beyond a reasonable doubt before the cause of action 
would be recognized. 112 All such attempts to narrow the statute 
108. See supra text preceding note 100. 
109. See .mpra text accompanying note 22 (discussing principles to be applied in de• 
veloping remedies). 
110. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854); RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACTS 
§ 330 (1928). 
111. E.g, U.S. CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 13-22. 
112. Beyond a reasonable doubt is, of course, the standard for determining guilt in a 
criminal case. It has no relevance to wage discrimination claims under either Title VII or 
the Equal Pay Act. This argument is merely another attempt to require the courts to 
treat antidiscrimination legislation like criminal statutes. Courts have unanimously re• 
fused to do so. See, e.g., Jackson v. Concord Co., 54 N.J. 113, 123 n.4, 253 A.2d 793, 798 
n.4 (1969) ("[O]ur statute is basically remedial and not penal in nature .... "). 
Federally, since the landmark case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), 
the Supreme Court has continued to reaffirm that Title VII is to be broadly construed to 
etfectuate the strong congressional purpose to eradicate discrimination "in whatever 
form," Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975) (noting that the central statutory purposes of Title VII 
are "eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for 
injuries sutfered through past discrimination") (footnote omitted); see also Hishon v. 
King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984); City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. 
Manhart, 4:J5 U.S. 702 (1978); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); Dothard 
v. Rawlinson, 4:la U.S. 321 (1977) (broadly construing Title Vil in sex discrimination 
cases). In Manhart, the Court stated: "Myths and purely habitual assumptions about a 
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have now been put to rest by the Supreme Court decision in 
Bazemore v. Friday. 113 In Bazemore, the Court held that "[a] 
plaintiff in a Title VII suit need not prove discrimination with 
scientific certainty; rather, his or her burden is to prove discrim-
ination by a preponderance of the evidence. "11" 
In wage discrimination cases, as in other Title VII cases, lack 
of precision in the evidence should not affect the prima facie 
case. The Supreme Court has stated that precision in the evi-
dence used is not required to establish discrimination. The evi-
dence need only be sufficiently strong to support an inference 
that the employer must address.1111 Almost everyone concedes 
that some portion of the low wages associated with jobs identi-
fied as women's or minorities' work is probably due to discrimi-
natory wage setting-though some portion may also be due to 
other discriminatory practices such as hiring, assignment, social-
ization of women affecting their choices, or lack of mobility. 116 
The question is how much the employer should be asked to rem-
edy. Therefore, when an employer maintains basically segre-
gated, low-paid jobs or job classifications, it is appropriate that 
the employer-who best knows which practices resulted in low 
pay for these groups-explain or justify them. If a differential 
that cannot be explained on grounds other than race, sex, or na-
tional origin persists, it is appropriate that certain risks be borne 
primarily by the employer. These include the risk that injury 
woman's inability to perform certain kinds of work are no longer acceptable reasons for 
refusing to employ qualified individuals, or for paying them less." 435 U.S. at 707 (em-
phasis added). The Court also has given a broad reading to the Equal Pay Act: "The 
Equal Pay Act is broadly remedial, and it should be construed and applied so as to fulfill 
the underlying purposes which Congress sought to achieve." Corning Glass Works v. 
Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 208 (1974). The Court in Corning Glass favorably referred to 
Griggs, incorporating that case's disparate impact analysis into the Equal Pay Act by 
broadly construing the Equal Pay Act to prohibit neutrally phrased factors other than 
sex that "nevertheless operated to perpetuate the effects of the company's prior illegal 
practice of paying women less than men for equal work." Id. at 209-10. 
113. 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986). 
114. Id. at 3009 (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 
252 (1981)). 
115. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584 n.25 (1979). 
116. See U.S. CoMM'N ON C1v1L RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 13-21. 
[T]his is not to suggest that there is no sex discrimination in the setting of wages 
or that no part of the wage gap can be attributed to discrimination. Since the 
wage gap is not entirely due to discrimination, however, it is wrong to try to 
eradicate that gap in the name of antidiscrimination. 
Id. at 70 (emphasis added). The Civil Rights Commission then proceeds to define "dis-
crimination" very narrowly, excluding all but intentional discrimination and severely re-
stricting the kinds of evidence it would find probative. Id. at 70-71; see also Blumrosen, 
Wage Discrimination and Job Segregation: The Survival of a Theory, 14 U. MICH. J.L. 
REF. 1, 5-6 (1980). 
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will be measured imprecisely and the risk that some mJuries 
may be attributable to discriminatory employment practices 
other than wage discrimination. The employer not only created 
the wage-setting system, but is in a better position to obtain key 
information and to make needed changes. 117 
On the other hand, plaintiffs cannot expect the kind of rem-
edy that would have been possible had they quantified their pre-
cise damages. The risk of uncertainty is thus shared in the pro-
posed wage discrimination remedy. Neither side can expect 
exactitude. Plaintiffs may not get all they think they are entitled 
to, but cannot prove; employers will not go scot-free because the 
plaintiffs cannot prove to a certainty the extent of damages as 
part of the prima facie case. The proposed remedy strikes area-
sonable balance. It goes far towards putting female and minority 
jobs into their rightful place on the pay scale, and it closes the 
wage gap between jobs identified with women and minorities 
and other jobs in the employer. It avoids entangling the courts 
in either the morass of job evaluation or economic theory in 
general. 
Furthermore, several other considerations support this ap-
proach. First, it is well within the parameters of judicial discre-
tion in formulating damage remedies under Title VII. Second, 
the sting of the wage increase is reduced to the extent it is not 
retroactive. 118 Third, as suggested above, the employer and the 
union, if there is one, may take additional steps in the future to 
deal with the need to adjust pay rates. Such changes may well 
include not only modifications to the wage-setting system, but 
redesign of jobs previously assigned primarily to women and mi-
norities. As the New Jersey Commission recognized, the elimina-
tion of job segregation requires funneling white men into previ-
ously segregated jobs as much as opening white male jobs to 
women and minorities. 119 The litmus test for the end of wage 
discrimination is when formerly segregated jobs can attract and 
retain white men in numbers sufficient enough to overcome the 
former identification and stigma. 
117. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 n.48 
(1977). 
118. See infra text accompanying note 179. 
119. N.J. ANALYSIS, supra note 40, at 3. 
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C. When One Job Is Shown To Be Undervalued in Violation 
of the Equal Pay Act 
In the third situation, when plaintiffs have proven a violation 
of the Equal Pay Act, remedying the identified violation is not 
the end, but only the beginning of a Title VII remedy for all jobs 
related to the one proven underpaid. 120 By proving the Equal 
Pay Act violation, the plaintiffs have established how much of 
the pay differential for that particular job is due to sex discrimi-
nation. The remedy mandated by the Equal Pay Act is to raise 
the pay of the "equal" job to match the pay for the comparable 
male job. 121 All female employees whose pay rates were keyed or 
otherwise related to the rate found to be in violation of the 
Equal Pay Act now have a Title VII claim that their wages 
should be raised as well. An employer's discrimination against 
women in one job is evidence that it discriminated in the others. 
The principles that were discussed in the preceding section 
should apply here as well. 122 If any job is proved undervalued, 
then it is not enough simply to reclassify it. The evidence of that 
job's rightful place in the overall scheme also suggests that all 
other positions related to it have also been undervalued, accord-
ing to the employer's own value system. The employer thus has 
"quantif[ied] the effect of sex discrimination on the wage 
rates. "123 This should be the measure of damages and thus the 
remedy. 
Thus, plaintiffs would argue that the employer has established 
a relationship between the wages paid to various female jobs. 
This relationship should be maintained when the Equal Pay Act 
violation is corrected. This is accomplished by raising the wages 
of all women in related jobs by an amount measured by the ex-
tent to which the "equal" job was underpaid. For example, New 
Jersey's position descriptions for "truck driver" (male, paid at 
range 10) and "bus driver" (female, paid at range 08) looked re-
markably similar. In fact, the New Jersey Commission reported: 
[T]he position description for truck driver in the Depart-
ment of Human Services requires that the "truck driver" 
120. Although wage discrimination based on race is not included in the Equal Pay 
Act, the same analysis should apply under Title VII when jobs held by blacks are paid 
less than similar jobs held by whites. Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986). 
121. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(l) (1982); see supra note 51. 
122. See supra section Il(B)(2) ("Putting women's and minorities' jobs into their 
rightful place"). 
123. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 181 (1981). 
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be able to get a bus driver's license, presumably because 
he might need it. In other words, sometimes a truck 
driver is a bus driver. But when HE is, he is paid a truck 
driver's pay.124 
Not only should the bus driver's pay be raised to that of the 
truck driver's, but any other women's jobs related to the bus 
driver job should likewise rise two pay grades. 
The truck driver example illustrates another problem area of 
pay alignment: formulating a remedy when several different 
men's jobs are all paid at the same rate, and a female job is 
proven "equal" to one of these. That is, the position description 
for "truck driver" describes not merely a single set of tasks and 
duties, but a group of various jobs to any one of which an appli-
cant may be assigned. Once assigned to a particular position, a 
driver would only do limited kinds of driving. The Commission 
noted, for instance, that there seemed to be more differences 
among some of the various kinds of trucking described in the 
truck driver description "than there is between 'truck driver' 
and 'bus driver,' but all the truck drivers are paid the same."125 
It is not uncommon for employers to group jobs with some 
generally similar requirements, but with different tasks and du-
ties, under one title or job description.126 Such groupings facili-
tate recruiting based on general skills, and are useful for pay 
purposes because they enable the payment of all at the rate of 
one of the included jobs.127 In fact, one way an employer can 
voluntarily mitigate the effect of segregated jobs is to classify 
several jobs, including some segregated female and some male or 
integrated jobs, under one non-sex-identified title. Evaluation 
and pay comparisons with community wage rates, for example, 
would then be performed on a generalized functional basis, 
choosing either integrated or male jobs for the comparison. 
Assume, for example, a work place where men doing several 
different jobs are all paid at the same rate, regardless of whether 
their jobs are subsumed under one title or have different titles, 
while women, also doing various jobs similar to the men's, are 
paid different rates. Pay for the women's jobs reflects differences 
124. N.J. ANALYSIS, supra note 40, at 24. 
125. Id. (emphasis added). 
126. Many clerical positions are also, in reality, collections of different jobs, depend-
ing on the agency, division, or department in which a person works. 
127. The New Jersey Commission noted the phenomenon of paying some jobs the 
rate for their highest skills, N.J. ANALYSIS, supra note 40, at 24, implying others, particu-
larly clerical jobs, may be paid at the rate of some of their lesser skills, id. at 9. 
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in skill level between the women's jobs, but all are paid less than 
the male jobs' rate. Such a fact pattern might be sufficient to 
establish discrimination, particularly if the women's work were 
sufficiently like the men's and the differential between the male 
and female pay was large.128 
If one of the women's jobs is proven the equal of one of the 
men's jobs under the standards of the Equal Pay Act, the rate 
for that job should be raised to that of the male jobs.129 Formu-
lating a remedy for the other female jobs keyed to the job that 
was proven to be the male job's equal becomes more complicated 
when there exists the kind of dual wage structure hypothesized 
here. Because the employer makes pay distinctions between the 
women's jobs according to perceived skill differentials, but all 
male jobs are paid at the same rate regardless of skill differen-
tials, the remedial issue is which employer structure to follow. It 
is clear that one of the female jobs should have been paid the 
male rate. The remaining question is whether the relative em-
ployer differentials should be maintained, if the women prevail 
in their argument that proof of the Equal Pay Act violation also 
· measures how much their pay was depressed. Such a remedy 
would order the "equal" job rate raised to that of the male rate. 
Other related female jobs would be paid either more or less than 
the male jobs, depending on their employer-determined relation-
ship to the "equal" job. An alternative remedy would be to 
change the female wage structure to match the male wage struc-
ture. In this case, all the female jobs related to the one proven 
128. See, e.g., Taylor v. Charley Bros. Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 602 (W.D. 
Pa. 1981). In Taylor, the employer operated a supermarket distribution center, which 
had two warehouses. Men in one warehouse used forklifts to select, move, and pack large 
items; women in the other warehouse also selected, moved, and packed, but handled 
smaller items, without mechanical aids. All men received one rate, and all women re-
ceived a different, lower one. The plaintiff's job evaluation experts testified that job con-
tent difference did not warrant the male pay differential. The court held that the em-
ployer's refusal, when asked, to do an evaluation of the jobs, in connection with the facts 
indicated above and anecdotal evidence of other discrimination on the basis of sex, 
proved sex-based wage discrimination under Title VII. 
129. This was the proof in Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In 
Thompson, male bindery workers were all paid at the same "craft rate." For each male 
job there was a matching woman's job that was supposedly an assisting role. The 
women's jobs were paid at various rates. Evid.ence indicated, however, that despite their 
"helper-type" titles, the women actually did work similar to much that the men did, 
although only one female job was held to meet the "equal" standard of the Equal Pay 
Act. The court awarded approximately $30 million to the women in that job. Because the 
case had been framed as one of equal pay, and no one raised the next question raised 
here-whether proof of the Equal Pay Act violation also established a violation of Title 
VII-the court did not reach that question. Obviously, it also did not reach the question 
of how to formulate a Title VII remedy for the related female jobs. 
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"equal" would be paid the same (male) rate. This remedy would 
carry out the employer decision that all (male) jobs should be 
paid the same, despite differences in required skills. 
Maintaining the female differentials seems a reasonable com-
promise position only if the "equal" female job is at the top of 
the women's pay structure. If it is not, then some women will be 
paid more than any of the men. Whether the male rate reflected 
the employer's judgment that the single male rate was the most 
any of those men's jobs should be paid, or whether the rate was 
bargained for in order to raise the lower valued craft jobs at the 
expense of the higher, the concept of a uniform rate probably 
should also be applied to all related women's jobs, once an Equal 
Pay Act violation in one job has been established. 
D. When Proof of Discriminatory Wage Structures Is 
Statistical 
Among the methods of proving that sex discrimination in-
fected an employer's wage structure that plaintiffs are now con-
sidering is a highly complicated form of statistical proof similar 
to that used in Vuyanich v. Republic National Bank. 130 Some 
state employers are also developing and implementing advanced 
statistical methods to revise their pay policies. It is more likely 
that such studies will be undertaken on a voluntary basis by em-
ployers and unions than that courts will require such studies. 
For example, both New York and Wisconsin are utilizing a "pol-
icy capturing" approach in revising their pay systems.131 In Wis-
130. 505 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Tex. 1980), vacated, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984); see 
also NRC REPORT, supra note 60 (setting out the methodology suggested by the National 
Academy of Sciences). 
131. Steinberg, Identifying Wage Discrimination and Implementing Pay Equity Ad-
justments, in 1 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS. COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's 
99, 110 (1984); see CENTER FOR WOMEN IN Gov'T, THE NEW YORK STATE PAY EQUITY 
STUDY (State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany 1986) [hereinafter NEW YORK STUDY] (describing 
New York's approach); Clauss, Comparable Worth-The Theory, Its Legal Foundation, 
and the Feasibility of Implementation, 20 U. M1cH. J.L. REF. 7, 49-54 (1986) (describing 
Wisconsin's approach). The methodology used by the Center for Women in Government 
study for New York State combined, first, psychometric techniques of questionnaire con-
struction, resulting in a structured questionnaire querying about characteristics of over 
3500 state jobs; second, sociometric techniques of sample selection in order to establish 
statistically the relationship between wages paid for jobs in the state employment system 
and the content of those jobs; and third, econometric techniques of data analysis to as-
sess potential costs and to make recommendations for phasing-in pay equity adjust-
ments. Steinberg, supra, at 110-11. The second step results in the development of a com-
pensation model adjusted statistically to remove the impact of "femaleness" and 
"minorityness." The model then can be applied to each female- and minority-dominated 
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consin, the methodology has enabled the Wisconsin Task Force 
to ascertain what job characteristics the state is really paying for 
in male-dominated jobs. This information is then used to deter-
mine what female jobs should be paid.132 Despite the sophisti-
cated methods utilized, the final results in both states and in 
Oregon-where the Task Force started from scratch to develop a 
new classification system, a new evaluation system, and recom-
mendations for an equitable compensation system133-have been 
similar to the results obtained with methods proposed in this 
Article. In all cases, the bulk of the jobs remedied are the cleri-
cal, health care, food, and service jobs occupied by women and 
minorities. Most of these were clustered below white male un-
skilled entry levels or were related to jobs that were. 134 I believe 
the three methods of proof relating to remedy described in the 
sections above will cover most of the cases and will, when ap-
plied, result in a wage structure that reflects the employer's 
judgment, modified to wring out discrimination. 
Ill. WHEN INTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS ARE THEMSELVES 
DISCRIMINATORY 
The discussion above assumes that the pay relationships es-
tablished by the employer among the women's and minorities' 
jobs are themselves fair-that they resemble the relationships 
among male jobs, and that internally both wage structures re-
flect the employer's nondiscriminatory judgment of what is fair. 
These internal relationships, however, may themselves some-
job title to obtain a predicted nondiscriminatory wage rate. Id. This, Dr. Steinberg 
claims, is "information analogous to the point comparisons [made by] other comparable 
worth studies," without making comparisons between specific male- and female-domi-
nated jobs. Id. An estimated 77,000 women and minorities employed by New York State 
are paid less than white males with jobs of comparable value to the State. NEw YORK 
STUDY, supra. The State will spend $74.1 million over two years to implement the recom-
mendations of the two studies. National Comm. on Pay Equity, Pay Equity News Notes 
1 (Apr. 1986). (A second study was done by Arthur Young on the State's job classifica-
tion and compensation system, see id.) Provisions requiring these studies were included 
in the 1982-1985 labor agreement with the Civil Service Employees Association, Local 
1000, AFSCME, which also negotiated $64 million for implementation in their 1985-1986 
contracts. Id. 
132. Clauss, supra note 131, at 52; see also REPORT OF WISCONSIN TASK FORCE ON 
COMPARABLE WORTH (1986). 
133. See generally OREGON REPORT. supra note 57. 
134. In Oregon, the Task Force recommended that 72~;, of the wage increases go to 
women in entry-level, support, and paraprofessional jobs. See OREGON REPORT, supra 
note 57, sec. V. 
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times be discriminatory. The following examples both illustrate 
the problem and suggest the remedy. 
A. Different Patterns for Relating Male Supervisory Jobs to 
Those Supervised 
In constructing job ladders, particularly when the employer 
has adopted a value system that places a premium on learned 
skills, discretion, and managerial know-how, supervisors of posi-
tions requiring more entry-level skills should be evaluated at a 
higher level than supervisors of the lesser skilled. Male job se-
ries, including those composed of higher ranking professional po-
sitions, seem to follow this standard operating procedure. In 
New Jersey, for example, the evaluation rating and pay range for 
the job title "supervisory accountant" reflect not only manage-
rial functions but also the fact that the people supervised are 
likewise professional. 1311 This, however, is not the case for many 
supervisory positions of predominately female jobs in New 
Jersey136 and elsewhere.137 A common pattern, in both public 
and private employment, is to pay supervisors and managers of 
traditionally female-intensive areas less than other department 
managers, despite the functional similarity of their work, qualifi-
cations, and job requirements. Lower pay for such jobs is partic-
ularly likely at the lower supervisory levels, where the supervi-
sors are also women. For example, even though clerical 
supervisors are required to have more experience in order to su-
pervise properly the more complex work of their subordinates, in 
New Jersey they are paid less than blue collar low and middle 
level supervisors, who according to state requirements supervise 
less skilled work and need less experience.138 As noted above, 139 
realignment from the bottom level up may alleviate much of this 
problem where the female/minority wage structure is internally 
fair. 
135. N.J. ANALYSIS, supra note 40, at 21. 
136. Id. 
137. See, e.g., Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1984). 
138. N.J. ANALYSIS, supra note 40, at 21. 
139. See supra text accompanying notes 60-71 & 96-98. 
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B. Internal Relationships Differ from Those in the White 
Male Wage Structure 
Internal relationships are, however, not always fair. There is 
evidence of instances in which the women's/minorities' wage 
structure is not only slotted further down the pay scale than the 
male wage structure, but the internal relationships are distorted 
and different than the structure for the male job group. This can 
occur in several ways. 
1. Minority or female career ladders are shorter- The ca-
reer ladder for traditional female and minority jobs may be 
truncated, so that promotion avenues are cut off, while on-the-
job training opportunities are provided for male jobs, thereby 
extending their career ladders. For instance, many "women's ar-
eas" traditionally have male top managers whose jobs typically 
are included in a different managerial series, not keyed to the 
female series. 140 Jobs are often disassociated from former promo-
tion ladders when a formerly white male job is "turned" or femi-
nized. Examples from banking and insurance are typical. Before 
World War II, bank tellers were white men; the job had high 
prestige and was the entry-level job leading to bank officer. 
Since that time, banks have begun to hire women and minorities 
as tellers. In turn, pay has not kept pace with other predomi-
nately male jobs; and the promotion ladder has been cut off as 
managers and future bank officers are more likely to be hired 
from recent MBA or college graduates. Similarly, in the insur-
ance industry, the position of "financial officer," formerly a male 
job of considerable responsibility in signing off on loans, has be-
come a women's job. In the process, it has been relegated to the 
lower portion of the firm's organization chart and to a narrowed 
range of salary levels. 141 
140. See supra note 89; see also Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 405-08; 
R. SHAEFFER & E. LYNTON, CORPORATE EXPERIENCES IN IMPROVING WOMEN'S JOB OPPOR-
TUNITIES 9-10 (1979) (a Conference Board Report); Malkiel & Malkiel, Male-Female Pay 
Differentials in Professional Employment, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 693 (1973) (economic 
study of male/female differentials in professional employment). 
[l)t is difficult for a discriminating organization to give male and female employ-
ees the same titles and pay them different amounts. It is far easier to assign 
women to lower job levels and then set up a pay structure by level that is the 
same for both sexes .... The assignments to job levels can most plausibly be 
interpreted as the mechanism by which discrimination takes place. 
Id. at 704. 
141. See generally Wage Discrimination, supra note 1. The "turning" of banking 
jobs is also noted in WoRK IN AMERICA 61 (1973) (report of a special task force to the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare). The insurance industry example is from 
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2. The top of the women's line is compressed or the male 
line is stretched- The top of the women's line may be com-
pressed more severely than male lines, or the male lines may be 
stretched out resulting in underpayment of the higher women's 
jobs. The point spreads for women's and men's or for minority 
and white jobs may not be the same, or they may not be the 
same throughout the wage hierarchy. 
This may occur if a men's job and a women's job, though dif-
ferent, are considered roughly equivalent by the employer. The 
principle that equal work be graded and paid equally would re-
quire that the two jobs be treated the same. To avoid this result, 
the employer may compress the top of female and minority pay 
lines by allotting fewer points between jobs than elsewhere in 
the pay structure. For example, a male line, such as building 
maintenance, and a women's line, such as housekeeper, may 
merge at the managerial level. Experience in either line qualifies 
an applicant for the entry-level managerial position that super-
vises both lines. The employer, therefore, considers the experi-
ence, skills, and responsibility gained in each line to be roughly 
equivalent. The top of the women's job line, however, is at a 
lower pay grade than the top of the predominately male line. 
That is, the top position in the housekeeper line of progression 
may be at pay range 18, whereas the top job in the male building 
maintenance line is at pay range 20. The entry-level managerial 
position where the lines merge is at pay range 21. The top of the 
women's line is underpaid, relative to the next male or inte-
grated job. Two kinds of discrimination flow from this: not only 
are the women in that top position and all other jobs keyed to it 
underpaid, but they are less likely to get any available promo-
tions because their job title is slotted into a lower grade than the 
equivalent male title. The latter effect is likely because there are 
fewer pay levels from the top of the male line to the managerial 
job than from the female line. Generally, the greater the pay 
jump between two adjacent jobs in a series, the more difficult it 
is to be promoted. Although not a universal practice, it is com-
mon to consider prior salary when assessing qualifications for 
promotion. 142 The consequence is that a higher proportion of top 
J. LYLE & J. Ross. WOMEN IN INDUSTRY 8 (1973). See also CENTER FOR WOMEN IN Gov'T, 
REPORT ON CAREER LADDERS IN NEW YORK STATE SERVICE (State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany 
1980); EEOC Hearings on Job Segregation and Wage Discrimination 643-51 (Center for 
Women in Gov't, State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany 1980) (testimony of Nancy Perlman, 
Executive Director, Center for Women in Gov't). 
142. See Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 429. Although the federal classifica-
tion system is predicated on the proposition that jobs should be paid according to the 
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managers in such lines tends to be men, and men have a greater 
opportunity for higher pay than women.143 
The fol1owing illustration of how stretching and shortening 
can skew male or female/minority lines is typical of many wage 
systems. Although New Jersey evaluates a day care technician 
and an assistant storekeeper at the same level, range 12, u• their 
respective supervisors are rated quite differently. The day care 
technician reports to a "head day care center technician" (fe-
male) who is only at one range higher (range 13) than she is, or 
to a "day care supervisor" (female) at range 16, whereas the as-
sistant storekeeper reports to a storekeeper II (male), range 16, 
or a storekeeper I (male), range 19. The day care supervisor, at 
three pay levels lower than the storekeeper I, requires three 
years of experience and college credit, whereas the storekeeper 
requires four years of experience, but no formal education. 1411 
Applying the New Jersey evaluation criteria, or the principle of 
even pay steps, would require the two supervisors to be paid ap-
proximately the same salary, yet the women's line is far more 
compressed than the men's. The remedy would be to apply the 
same standard to both male and female, and minority and white 
pay lines. Obviously, in devising such remedies, care should also 
be taken to include revisions for all related jobs so that the pay 
line is not squeezed from either the top or the bottom. 
Although examples of internally discriminatory wage struc-
tures are not rare, a court should probably assume that internal 
relationships are "fair," leaving to the plaintiff the task of dem-
onstrating that they are not. 
qualifications required and the responsibilities entailed-without regard to what compa-
rable jobs bring in the private sector-applicants are generally placed in jobs at salary 
levels that do not deviate more than a given amount from the last salary, nor are promo-
tions that skip grades usually allowed. See Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873 (9th 
Cir. 1982) (finding that the company's policy of basing salary on prior salary, in the 
absence of an acceptable business reason, violated Title VII). 
143. The example of the housekeeper and maintenance lines was drawn from data on 
those jobs in New Jersey from the time when New Jersey maintained sex-segregated 
jobs. The two separate lines were merged into the present building maintenance series. 
See supra notes 88-89. 
144. N.J. ANALYSIS, supra note 40, at 22. The day care technician (female) is responsi-
ble for the physical, mental, and emotional well-being of assigned mentally retarded chil-
dren and adults. The assistant storekeeper (male) is responsible for unloading and un-
packing shipments, and maintaining stock in proper condition. 
145. Id. 
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IV. RECOGNIZING LEGITIMATE FACTORS THAT CAUSE PAY 
DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL WORKERS 
The objective of a remedy, under any form of proof, is not to 
equalize the wages of all workers. There are valid reasons for 
wage differentials that the law does not challenge. In fact, both 
Title VII and the Equal Pay Act recognize the role of seniority, 
merit, productivity, and exceptional service as defenses to pay 
differentials. 146 Any theory of remedy must recognize, and per-
haps emphasize, the legitimacy of these distinctions. But these 
are all distinctions related to performance in the work place and 
can be reviewed and evaluated. 
There are also times when recruiting difficulties and market 
conditions should be recognized as justifications for pay differen-
tials. New Jersey, for example, recognizes both seniority and 
market supply factors. Market factors, however, do not seem to 
have the same effect on employer pay decisions for women's as 
for men's jobs.147 Generally, all employees start at the first step 
of the assigned pay range. Pay increases with increased seniority 
in automatic increments as workers proceed up the employment 
ladder. When recruiting is difficult, however, the State can rec-
ognize an exception to its policy of not using market rates to 
determine pay for specific positions, only to determine the gen-
eral level of compensation schedules. An "authorized hiring 
rate" can also be requested. This usually allows agency person-
nel to recruit at the· second or third step of the pay range for 
specific jobs requiring skills in short supply.148 
The New Jersey Commission, however, warned that the au-
thorized hiring rate authority, supposedly necessitated by mar-
ket forces, was not used in the same way for female jobs as for 
male jobs. 149 Almost all positions with authorized hiring rates 
are predominately white male. Although there was a two-step in-
crease authorized for clerk-stenographer and clerk-transcriber, 
for example, other female jobs in short supply were not so 
146. Civil Rights Act § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 
206(d)(l)(i)-(iii) (1982) (Equal Pay Act exceptions for seniority, merit, and systems that 
measure earnings by quantity or quality of production). 
147. See N.J. ANALYSIS, supra note 40, at 27. 
148. Several years ago, for example, engineers were scarce and their starting salaries 
in the private sector were considerably higher than the State of New Jersey was offering. 
A higher rate, still about $2000 below the average offers, was authorized. At the same 
time, similar adjustments were made in the salary structure of related upper level engi-
neering positions. DEPARTMENT OF C1v1L SERV., C1v1L SERV. CoMM'N, STATE OF N.J., 74TH 
ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1980-1981); see N.J. ANALYSIS, supra note 40, at 27. 
149. N.J. ANALYSIS, supra note 40, at 27-28. 
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treated. 1110 Even at the time when most public and private hospi-
tals were extensively hiring nurses from the temporary registers 
at much higher wages than stated rates, no authorized hiring 
rate had been requested for nurses, nor for word processors who 
are now typically offered premium pay. 1111 The Commission sug-
gested that use of these special rates be monitored to ensure 
they are not requested or authorized in a discriminatory fashion 
and that they are discontinued when no longer needed. 
Because the market rate for women's and minorities' jobs is 
likely to incorporate discriminatory wage-setting practices of all 
the employers who make up that market, employers should not 
be able simply to rely on "the market"162 to justify their pay 
practices. If, however, it is considered desirable to allow a lim-
ited market defense, the employer should have the burden of 
establishing that there is a labor shortage that adversely affects 
recruiting, that attempts at recruiting at the scheduled rates 
failed, and that the skills in short supply are needed. Such ex-
ceptions should periodically be reviewed and should cease when 
no longer needed. Pay decisions that continue the historical con-
spiracy of employers to keep women's wages low by reliance on 
each other's actions in the "market place" should not be al-
lowed.1113 The remedies proposed can take into account the em-
ployer's need to remain competitive. These remedies leave com-
150. Id. at 27. 
151. The Commission checked classified help-wanted ads in the Newark Star Ledl{er 
and in the New York Times from August 1982 through February 1983. A review of the 
classified ads in the July 6, 1986 edition of the New York Times revealed that the facts 
the Commission found in 1982 and 1983 are still true. 
152. For arguments that the market rate incorporates discrimination and that the 
policy of the Equal Pay Act prohibiting paying a woman less than that for which a man 
would work because she is willing to do so should be considered incorporated into Title 
VII, see Wal{e Discrimination, supra note 1, at 488. 
153. The use of market rate information to regulate wages, even by employers who 
compete in other respects, has been noted by, inter alia, J. ROBINSON, THE EcoNOMICS OF 
IMPERFECT CoMPETITION 218 (2d ed. 1969); E.H. PHELPS BROWN, THE INEQUALITY OF PAY 
(1977). The fact that employers can and do act in their common interest without open 
collusion has been recognized, inter alia, by the doctrine of "conscious parallelism" under 
the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). Moreover, within an industry, em-
ployers often overtly-and probably legally-discuss and agree on what level of wages to 
pay for specific jobs: multi-employer, industrywide, and pattern bargaining are common 
wage-setting practices, as are formal and informal meetings among personnel managers 
such as the monthly meetings of hospital personnel administrators in which agreement is 
reached on how much nurses and other health care workers will be offered and paid. 
Conversations with New Jersey and New York hospital administrators (1985); see also 
NATIONAL CoMM. ON PAY EQUITY, THE CosT OF PAY EQUITY IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EM-
PLOYMENT 74 (1984) (noting that how consistent some of this meeting and talking about 
wages is with free market competition and antitrust laws is a worry for at least one 
manager interviewed). 
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petitive market decisions to the employer or to collective 
bargaining. An employer's classification, evaluation, or compen-
sation systems would be subject to scrutiny, and remedy, only 
when they have adversely affected the compensation for jobs 
identified with women and minorities. 
V. REMEDIES AND COSTS 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that most, if not all, of 
the proof problems relating to wage discrimination are subject to 
resolution through careful and practical analysis of the type with 
which courts and lawyers are familiar. Even if the foregoing 
analysis is accepted, employers have developed another argu-
ment that, if accepted, might overwhelm the practical considera-
tions discussed above. This is the argument with respect to the 
costs of remedying wage discrimination. 
A. Costs of Remedies 
One of the bugaboos employers use to scare both courts and 
the public away from tackling the issues of wage discrimination 
is that the cost will be exorbitant. This simply is not true. Em-
ployers, including such large employers as the State of Minne-
sota, that have undertaken revisions to achieve pay equity have 
consistently estimated the cost at between one percent and four 
percent of their payroll. uH In Minnesota, for example, the legis-
lature ordered that pay equity be achieved within five years. 11111 
The plan adopted by Minnesota required a report and appropri-
ation for this purpose every two years. 156 Within four years, 
Minnesota brought the wages for all female-dominated job titles 
to the average pay line of male-dominated job titles. The State 
began implementation with pay equity adjustment appropria-
tions of $21.8 million, adding roughly seven million dollars annu-
154. See, e.g., MINNESOTA REPORT, supra note 42, at 1-5 (estimated cost of pay equity 
in the U.S.); id. at 15 (Minnesota state costs); id. at 18 (Minnesota local governments' 
cost estimates); OREGON REPORT, supra note 57, at 43 (estimating Oregon cost at 1.1 % of 
state payroll); National Comm. on Pay Equity: State Update (Apr. 1986) (reporting that 
46 states have taken some action, and 12 states, Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Michigan, 
Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Washington, 
and Wisconsin, are providing pay equity salary increases to their employees). 
155. State Employees Pay Equity Act, ch. 634, 1982 Minn. Laws 1559 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 43A). 
156. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 43A.05(5)-(6) (West Supp. 1987). 
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ally to the wage bill. 1117 Although a fair pay system was originally 
estimated to cost Minnesota four percent of payroll, the total 
cost of eliminating the wage gap was only 3. 7 % . Individual pay 
equity increases averaged about $2200 annually, without reduc-
tions or freezes in salaries for male-dominated jobs. 1118 In New 
Jersey, the Task Force on Equitable Compensation estimated 
that its initial proposal would cost about seven million dollars 
and would affect almost 80% of the women and minorities in 
state employ. 1 1!9 New Jersey employs over 65,000 people, and 
about half are women or minorities. 160 
Opponents' propaganda, on the other hand, puts the bill for 
fair pay at as much as 20% or more of the gross national prod-
uct. 161 Such figures are patent distortions. 162 First, economic and 
sociological studies attribute from 20% to 50% of the wage dif-
ferential between men and women to factors that cannot be jus-
tified on grounds unrelated to discrimination. 163 Even using 
these figures, however, does not mean that the cost of eliminat-
ing the wage gap would add 20 % to 50 % more to the national 
payroll. If 20% of the gap is attributable to discrimination, the 
cost to remedy that gap would be only 8 % more than the cur-
rent national wage bill. 164 Even this estimate is high because it 
assumes that all the differential is due to underpayment for 
women's jobs. In reality, much of it is due to the fact that more 
men are in higher level jobs. 161! This may reflect discrimination 
in hiring, assignment, and promotion-problems separate from 
wage discrimination. These forms of discrimination should not 
be confused; nor is one a substitute for the other. Long after an 
employer announces that access to all jobs is open to everyone, 
157. Rothchild, supra note 49, at 211. 
158. Id. at 210. 
159. See Act approved Jan. 8, 1986, ch. 402, 1985 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 177 (West) 
(No. 11) (appropriating that amount for pay equity implementation); see supra text ac-
companying note 102. 
160. Preface to N.J. ANALYSIS, supra note 40, at i. 
161. Cf. U.S. CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 38. This study cites Dr. 
Glasner of Hay Associates as estimating that to rectify 80~,, of the pay gap, when the pay 
gap is based on a 60'.';, ratio, see infra note 164, would result in a $320 billion increase in 
higher wages and benefits for women. The study also cites Professor Schwab as calculat-
ing that the annual cost in wages would be about $413 billion. Id. 
162. The Civil Rights Commission does note that these estimated costs are "un-
doubtedly too high" because the pay gap is not due entirely to discrimination. Id. at 38 
n.114. 
163. See Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 454-57. 
164. The male/female wage gap is approximately 40'7,,-that is, women earn about 
60'';, of men's earnings. Twenty percent of 40';,,, or 8';;,, is thus the unexplained 
differential. 
165. See supra note 162. 
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so long as formerly segregated jobs retain their identity as fe-
male or minority and their relative place on the wage scale re-
mains unchanged, the employer's pay structure perpetuates the 
effects of the prior segregation. This is a wage discrimination 
that still must be remedied. However, because women's and mi-
norities' jobs are not scattered through the pay schedule, but 
rather tend to be clustered at the low end of the spectrum, pay 
raises bringing these jobs into their rightful place in the com-
pensation schedule will cost less than the doomsayers predict. 
Interestingly, opponents of pay equity tend to be of two minds 
about these socioeconomic statistical studies. When the issue is 
the existence of wage discrimination, they deride significance of 
the studies as a method of identifying that there is a problem of 
discrimination in pay. They claim that because some studies ex-
plain more of the gap than others, the existence of any unex-
plained differential is due to researchers ignoring some legiti-
mate explanatory factors rather than to discrimination. When 
pointing with horror to the potential cost of remedying pay dis-
crimination, however, the same opponents who denied the exis-
tence of discrimination derive their cost estimates from the 
studies that indicate the largest amount of unexplained 
differential. 
The remedies proposed here to cure pay inequities are not 
based on abstract macroeconomic arguments about closing the 
"wage gap" between men and women. These·remedies are based 
on the employer's own assessment of the relative values of vari-
ous job categories, not on some abstract notions of human capi-
tal or on regression analyses that take account of mythical vari-
ables that "might have" affected wage rates in an "ideal" labor 
market. 188 The focus here is much simpler-it is rooted in both 
the legal system and in industrial relations practice. The focus is 
on what the employer has done and on what the employer 
claims·it is doing. These have always been the source of discrim-
ination determinations. Nor is the aim necessarily to make a sig-
nificant dent in the overall relative earnings of men and women. 
The purpose of the remedy is to eliminate the effects of race and 
sex discrimination on particular wage rates. These are the rates 
that employers have set through a system "within which relative 
wage rates are also determined among job classifications, not by 
166. For discussion of some of the realities not encompassed by recent labor eco-
nomic writing, see Dunlop, supra note 61, at 10, 12, reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 
at D-1, D-2 ("[S]pecial and peculiar features are at work, that do not permit the unre-
strained application of competitive theory, as applied to other markets .... [W]ages are 
not simply determined by supply and demand.") (citing J. HICKS, supra note 61, at 319). 
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individuals, with the aid of job evaluation or incentive systems 
or by decisions exercised by management or through collective 
bargaining. "167 
B. How to Remedy a 20% Underpayment for 2% of the 
Payroll 
Another source of a 20% cost estimate are the studies that 
have been conducted in the various states. Beginning with the 
State of Washington Comparable Worth Study in 197 4,168 these 
studies169 have demonstrated a pervasive 20% difference be-
tween the evaluated scores for predominately women's jobs and 
the market rates for comparable jobs. The extent of this differ-
ence is a measure of the extent to which the market rate dis-
counts the value of women's jobs. This does not mean, however, 
that the remedy will cost 20% of the nation's wage bill. Only 
about 2 % of an employer's payroll may be needed to remedy a 
20% underpayment because women and minorities work in low-
paid jobs. If 80 % of the women and minorities annually earn 
less than the poverty level-now about $12,000 in New 
Jersey-and if, moreover, many of these workers are paid less 
than $8000, then even a 20 % raise may not cost much. Further-
more, a 20 % estimate may itself be too high in many instances. 
The remedy outlined above170- aligning all unskilled entry-level 
jobs with the first major white male unskilled job, while main-
taining the internal wage relationships between the female and 
minority jobs-would mean women's and minorities' jobs would 
rise two pay grades in the New Jersey system. 171 This would re-
quire only a 10% raise-or $1000-for each affected title. This 
may not seem like much, but for someone earning $8000 a year, 
an additional $1000 represents a great deal. 172 
167. Id. at 16, reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at D-3. 
168. WASHINGTON STUDY, supra note 47. 
169. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMM. ON PAY EQUITY, supra note 153; WASHINGTON STUDY, 
supra note 47; N. WILLIS & Assocs., STATE OF WASHINGTON COMPARABLE WORTH 
STUDY-PHASE II (1976); NEW YORK STUDY, supra note 131; HUBBARD & REvo-CoHEN, 
INC., PRELIMINARY PAY EQUITY STUDY OF WYOMING STATE WORKFORCE (1985) (study au-
thorized by the Governor of Wyoming). 
170. See supra text accompanying notes 59-63. 
171. In the New Jersey system, there is a $500 difference between pay ranges at the 
first step of the pay ranges. See generally N.J. COMPENSATION SCHEDULES, supra note 50. 
172. The very people who simultaneously say that (a) the amount of wage discrimina-
tion is unknowable, and (b) that it would cost so much to remedy that it would disrupt 
the entire economy, also conclude that so small a part of the wage gap is due to discrimi-
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C. Other Impacts of Remedying Wage Discrimination 
Assessed 
The impact of pay equity increases on the national economy 
will be even less drastic because many low-paid workers must 
now supplement their incomes with food stamps and other pub-
lic aid. These costs to the government will be eliminated. Fed-
eral and state revenues will increase, as low-paid workers move 
into higher tax brackets. Moreover, there are reasons to believe 
that productivity will rise and absenteeism will fall. 173 
Perhaps one of the most important reasons for remedying un-
derpaid women's and minorities' work is the ongoing shift in the 
postindustrial economy from smokestack industries to high tech-
nology and service industries. This has meant the flight of much 
traditional white male blue collar work overseas.174 The areas of 
expanding employment opportunity are in the service and cleri-
cal areas, which traditionally have tended to comprise female 
and minority jobs. Furthermore, it is precisely those ar-
eas-including health care, personal services, and food ser-
vices-that are among the fastest growing and are the least 
likely to be exportable. It also is becoming apparent that devel-
oping high technology is likely to generate far more low level 
jobs of the kind usually occupied by women and minorities than 
high level managerial jobs. m Therefore, a reappraisal of under-
valued women's and minorities' jobs now is likely to benefit not 
only women and minorities, but also the white males who in-
creasingly may find that they will have to work in such areas. 
A recurring argument against every piece of remedial legisla-
tion in the last sixty years has been that it will cost too much 
and that the very people to be helped will suffer because raising 
wages will increase unemployment, affecting first the marginal 
nation in compensation that it is not worth using law to correct the underpayments. See, 
e.g., U.S. CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 40, 70; see also supra note 116. 
173. See Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 421. Low-paying dead-end jobs in 
which the workers have little feeling of dignity or reward have high rates of turnover, 
absenteeism, and tardiness, no matter who occupies the job. See generally R. TsucHI-
GANE & N. DODGE, ECONOMIC DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1974); WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FACTS ABOUT WOMEN'S ABSENTEEISM AND 
LABOR TURNOVER 6 (1969), 
174. See generally Mitchell, The Changing American Workplace, 1 LAB. LAW. 301 
(1985). There has also, of course, been a significant loss of certain traditional women's 
work, such as that of unskilled and semiskilled operative jobs in the garment and elec-
tronics industries. 
175. See id. at 308. 
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workers who are most likely to be women and minorities.176 It is 
not clear that remedying wage discrimination as suggested here 
will have such an effect, because not only are these jobs largely 
in expanding areas, but the rest of the century will see an in-
creasing scarcity of labor. Any possible replacement of workers 
in labor-intensive industries by capital investment should not 
result in additional total unemployment. 
D. Cost Is Not a Title VII Defense 
The high cost of remedy has never been a defense under Title 
VII, 177 nor is it a reason to refuse to recognize and remedy wage 
discrimination based on sex. In one sense, from the point of view 
of the cost to the society, there is no additional cost to remedy-
ing wage discrimination. The remedy simply shifts the cost from 
women and minorities, who have been subsidizing the produc-
tion of the goods or services, to another group. This other group 
could be shareholders, taxpayers, or consumers, depending on 
other managerial decisions and the ability of companies to raise 
product prices. 
On the other hand, pay hikes do raise labor costs for particu-
lar employers. In this way, pay equity does carry a cost that 
remedies for other forms of discrimination rarely do. To the ex-
tent that the employer must now pay more for the same services, 
it is unlike ordering an employer to hire or promote A instead of 
B. Except for back pay awards, no cost attaches to an employer 
who must remedy exclusionary practices. The same amount of 
pay is simply allocated to different people than would have held 
those jobs had the discriminatory practices continued. The cost 
involved in raising the pay of discriminatorily depressed jobs, 
therefore, is analogous to awards of back (or front) pay under 
Title VII in terms of real cost.178 But employers do not have the · 
same incentive to take remedial action. 
The sting of the pay raises is, however, mitigated to the extent 
that there is no back pay. The Supreme Court has recognized 
176. See, e.g., U.S. CoMM'N ON C1v1L RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 38-40. 
177. See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-
17 (1978). 
178. In 1972, Congress amended Title VII, restricting awards of back pay to two 
years prior to filing the complaint, Civil Rights Act § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) 
(1982). The Equal Pay Act restricts back pay to two years, unless the violation is willful, 
in which case employees can get three years' liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216-217 
(1982). Equal Pay Act remedies also include raising future pay permanently, id. 
§ 206(d)(l); see Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 207 (1974). 
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that back pay is inappropriate when the law has been unclear, 179 
or if the refusal to award back pay does not undermine the pur-
poses of Title VII to eradicate all forms of discrimination and to 
make whole victims of discrimination. 
Back pay awards should be the norm in wage cases only when 
there is proof of intentional discrimination or gross delay in vol-
untarily taking remedial steps after the employer knows its sys-
tem adversely affects segregated jobs. Under this approach, the 
costs of the court-ordered remedy would be lessened, and the 
incentives for employers and unions to self-evaluate and revise 
their systems would be improved. This approach, then, not only 
cuts costs, but is consonant with the national policy of encourag-
ing voluntary action to remedy discrimination.180 The Court has 
ruled that back pay is necessary in discrimination cases because 
the threat of back pay acts as a "spur or catalyst which causes 
employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their 
employment practices. " 181 
Employers should be encouraged to revise their own pay sys-
tems. They should be penalized only when they know the pay 
for segregated jobs is depressed and fail to do anything about 
it. 182 Some have argued that employers should be encouraged to 
179. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (majority and concurring 
opinions recognize, and seem to approve, lower courts' refusal to award back pay when it 
was not clear whether state protective laws were preempted by Title VII); see also Ari-
zona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (per curiam) (denying retroactive 
monetary relief because a conflict between the Wage and Hour Administrator's interpre-
tation of Equal Pay Act pension contribution and benefit requirements and that of the 
EEOC under Title VII had left the law unclear); Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (A conflict be-
tween agency interpretations had left the law unclear.). The Norris Court extended the 
period of no back pay because the law still was not clear and a contrary ruling would 
have jeopardized the pension fund. 463 U.S. at 1106-07. 
180. According to the Supreme Court, back pay serves two purposes of Title VII: (1) 
"to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment dis-
crimination," Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 418, and (2) to "provide the spur or catalyst which 
causes employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment prac-
tices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate 
and ignominious page in this country's history." Id. at 417-18 (quoting United States v. 
N.L. Indus., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)). 
181. Id. at 417-18. 
182. See EEOC v. Inland Marine Indus., 729 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 855 (1984) (finding race discrimination because the employer had been notified that 
the black worker was paid less than white workers); cf. AFSCME v. Washington, 578 
F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1984), reu'd, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985). The district court 
in AFSCME found deliberate intentional discrimination because the State of Washing-
ton did a comparable worth study, recognized that women's positions were undervalued 
and underpaid because of discrimination, but did not take steps to remedy the under-
payments for 10 years, despite a surplus in the state treasury during part of that time. 
The Ninth Circuit reversed on the grounds that the State could rely on the market rate 
in setting wages. The court of appeals seemed to regard the use of job evaluation as only 
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undertake job evaluation studies and to change their pay prac-
tices and that, to accomplish that end, the results of job evalua-
tions should not be used as evidence of discrimination, lest em-
ployers decline to undertake them. The argument is simply 
wrong. It turns Albemarle183 on its head. Albemarle noted that 
Title VII was a catalyst to cause employers to reevaluate their 
employment practices so as to eliminate those that were discrim-
inatory. An employer who reevaluates but takes no action on the 
basis of the evaluation should not be considered as having met 
the obligation that Albemarle implied. 
Employers should be able to undertake remedial actions alone 
or through the collective bargaining process. They should be al-
lowed time to make adjustments, and when they do so, those 
efforts should not be used against them as proof of discrimina-
tion. Moreover, employers should be encouraged to adopt mea-
sures to develop more equitable compensation systems without 
having to admit that their systems have ever been discrimina-
tory. One protection for employers and unions who want to un-
dertake such remedial efforts can be found in the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission affirmative action guidelines, 
which permit affirmative action without confessions of discrimi-
nation. 184 As an exercise of discretion, courts should also be able 
to refuse back pay when employers have in good faith audited 
and reevaluated their compensation practices. Such refusals 
would be consonant with the spirit of the Albemarle decision 
and with the purposes of antidiscrimination law.186 But employ-
ers who audit, know some women's and minorities' jobs are un-
derpaid, and do nothing should not be protected. That is the 
real lesson of Albemarle. It is as relevant to wage discrimination 
as to any other violation of Title VII. 
proof of the comparable worth of the men's and women's jobs, but rejected the compara-
ble worth theory. The opinion does not deal with the claim that the employer, itself, 
recognized and labeled underpayment as a product of discrimination and then refused to 
remedy it. Washington has since appropriated money to remedy the underpayments. See 
also American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986) (rejecting the claim 
that a job evaluation study that indicates women's jobs are paid less than their evaluated 
worth, while men's are paid their evaluated worth, indicates discrimination). 
183. Albemarle, 422 U.S. 405. 
184. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1608 (1986); see Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara 
County, Cal., 55 U.S.L.W. 4379 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1987). 
185. Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1983) (holding that an offer of em-
ployment tolls back pay liability in order to encourage settlement offers by employers). 
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E. Advice for Employer's Counsel 
Most large employers have used job evaluation systems that 
have left them vulnerable to charges of wage discrimination. 
Now-when the law is still in a state of flux-is the time for 
these employers to review and revise their pay practices. Any 
possible back pay liability can be avoided if an employer reme-
dies putative discriminatory practices and no suit is brought 
within 180 days, or within 300 days if there is an accredited 
state or local agency.188 It is not necessary for an employer to get 
involved with studies such as those undertaken by states like 
Washington and Illinois. Many employers resist such studies, 
fearing that the results may be held against them-either as evi-
dence of the amount sex discrimination has affected pay or, if 
there is no attempted remedy, as evidence of intentional dis-
crimination. It is possible, however, to make the kinds of revi-
sions suggested here without such a study. Following the analy-
sis suggested above, it is likely that when the evaluation/ 
compensation system is examined, at least one of the three pat-
terns described will be found. Remedy can be achieved for each 
relatively quickly and without undue expense. The analysis de-
veloped in this paper also can be used to test the validity of the 
design or implementation of any new job evaluation or compen-
sation systems that employers may consider. 
CONCLUSION 
The resistance of the courts to wage discrimination claims is 
based, at least in part, on concerns that the issue will prove in-
tractable. These concerns have been emphasized by employer 
counsel hoping to keep the court out of the field of wage dis-
crimination. But they have also been given substance by some 
"comparable worth" advocates who have no difficulty with the 
idea of courts supervising employer wage practices. The reme-
dies for wage discrimination described in this Article should lay 
to rest the concerns of judges and encourage the courts to meet 
186. Civil Rights Act § 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982). Section 706(e) provides 
that a charge of an unlawful employment practice must be filed within 180 days of the 
alleged practice. Cf. United Airlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977) (refusing to accept 
plaintiff's argument that her claim was not barred because the employer's seniority sys-
tem gave "present effect" to a previous unlawful practice). Where a state or local agency 
exists, the charge must be made within 300 days of the challenged practice. Cf. Mohasco 
Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980) (construing the 300-day limitation narrowly). 
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the substantive issues of wage discrimination head-on. The rem-
edies suggested here are practical. They do not require esoteric 
studies or macroeconomic analyses. They will not revise the em-
ployers' wage practices de novo. They are premised on the ac-
ceptance of the relative value of jobs set by the employer. But 
they will enable the courts to frame a practical remedy that will 
eliminate the most blatant forms of sex- and race-based wage 
discrimination. Because the remedies are practical and easily ad-
ministered, the principles suggested can also be used by employ-
ers wishing to avoid Title VII litigation in the first instance. 
Such employers can take affirmative action to "defuse" wage 
discrimination claims and to reduce the likelihood that any 
claims that are pursued will be successful. Thus, these remedies 
fit within the broad objectives of Title VII-to reform discrimi-
natory industrial relations systems through voluntary action 
with a minimum of litigation. 

